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Working memory (WM) refers to the cognitive system that enables temporary main-
tenance and manipulation of information (Baddeley, 2010; Carlisle, Arita, Pardo, & Wood-
man, 2011; Cowan, 1999; Oberauer, 2002). Therefore, WM allows us to accomplish most of 
our everyday cognitive tasks such as searching for a friend in a bar in Mexico or using your 
ATM pin to take money from an ATM. WM operations are also critical for higher-order 
cognitive functions such as planning and problem-solving. For example, by applying math-
ematical operations on numbers held in WM, one can calculate the percent of discount of-
fered on a product in a shop. Although there is still no strict definition of WM, there is some 
consensus on its main characteristics. Specifically, it is generally agreed that WM process-
es internal representations in the absence of sensory input. These representations are lost 
rapidly unless maintained by rehearsal (Barrouillet, Bernardin, & Camos, 2004; Berman, 
Jonides, & Lewis, 2009; Zhang & Luck, 2009). Why information is lost from WM without 
rehearsal is a subject of ongoing debate. Decay theories assume that WM traces fade away 
over time (Barrouillet & Camos, 2012; Barrouillet et al., 2004; Burgess & Hitch, 2006). The 
opposing interference-based view assumes that forgetting of information in WM is due to 
interference from competing material (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Brown, 2009; Oberauer 
& Lewandowsky, 2014; Oberauer, Lewandowsky, Farrell, Jarrold, & Greaves, 2012). The lim-
ited durability of internal representations in WM may be associated with the fact that WM 
allows for only a few representations to be retained at the same time (Cowan, 2010; Luck & 
Vogel, 1997). Because of this limitation, there is a need to maintain only information that is 
relevant for a current task and to filter out or forget information that is no longer relevant. 
The prioritization of relevant over irrelevant information is supervised by the attentional 
system (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). However, the role of attention in processing informa-
tion in WM is not restricted to the selection of information. In fact, WM and attention in-
teract dynamically and often overlap in their functions (Awh, Vogel, & Oh, 2006; Kiyonaga 
& Egner, 2013). For instance, there have been several studies that have shown that holding 
information in WM will lead to attentional selection of matching stimuli in the environment 
(Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006; Soto, Hodsoll, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2008). 
Taken together, most of the tasks in everyday life necessitate the employment of WM. 
This is often associated with dynamic switching between successive tasks and the require-
ment to process a large amount of information. However, not all information can be pro-
cessed at once, thus encoding, selection and deactivation of information in WM need to 
occur dynamically and flexibly to meet the demands of an ongoing task. The studies docu-
mented in this thesis provide further insights into the dynamics involved in the encoding, 
selection and deactivation of information in WM. To this end, we examined how various task 
conditions influence WM activation using the phenomenon of memory-driven attentional 
capture as our primary index of the degree of WM activation. 
Models of working memory
The concept of WM was developed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) as an alternative to 
the more passive short-term memory notion of Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968). According to 
Baddeley’s multicomponent model (Baddeley, 1992; Baddeley, 2003; Repovs & Baddeley, 
2006), WM comprises a supervisory central executive system which controls two subor-
4dinate systems: the phonological loop and the visuo-spatial sketchpad. The phonological 
loop holds verbal information whereas the visuo-spatial sketchpad holds visual information. 
Memory traces that are encoded verbally can be refreshed by active rehearsal to prevent 
forgetting. The last addition to the model was a capacity-limited episodic buffer which inte-
grates information from different systems including WM sub-systems and LTM (Baddeley, 
2000). 
Recent models of WM distinguish between different states of WM content rather than 
separate systems (Cowan, 2008, 2011, Oberauer, 2002, 2013; Olivers, Peters, Houtkamp, & 
Roelfsema, 2011). These models became popular because they can easily accommodate the 
results of neuroimaging studies that show that information in WM can adopt different states 
depending on task demands (Larocque, Lewis-Peacock, & Postle, 2014; Lewis-Peacock & 
Postle, 2012). In Cowan’s model (1995, 2008, 2011), WM is conceived of as the activated 
part of long-term memory (LTM), and it is assumed that attention can be used to focus on 
a subset of the items represented in the activated part of LTM. Items in the activated part 
of memory can be deactivated by temporal decay and interference. The focus of attention, 
in turn, is assumed to have a capacity limited to about four items (Cowan, 2010). This as-
sumption is supported by behavioral and EEG studies showing that WM can hold about four 
objects online (Cowan, 2010; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Luria, Balaban, Awh, & Vogel, 2016; Vogel 
& Machizawa, 2004).  
Oberauer’s  model (2002, 2009, 2013) is built on similar assumptions as Cowan’s mod-
el (1995, 2008, 2011), although it uses slightly different terminology.  The main modifi-
cation in Oberauer’s model concerns the assumption that the focus of attention is limited 
to only a single item, unlike Cowan’s assumption that it can include up to four items. In 
addition, Oberauer proposes that there are three possible states in which representations 
can be stored in WM: a single-item focus of attention, a capacity limited region of direct 
access, and the activated part of long-term memory. Similar to Cowan’s model (1995; 2008; 
2011), the representations in the activated part of long-term memory can be accessed by 
WM. The region of direct access in Oberauer’s model corresponds to focus of attention in 
Cowan’s model. The limitation of the region of direct access in Oberauer’s model, however, 
is a consequence of interference between concurrent representations in WM rather than a 
capacity limit per se as in Cowan’s model. The function of the focus of attention is to select 
one currently task-relevant item amongst the representations activated in WM.  
In examining the multiple states account of WM activation, Oberauer (2001) used a 
modified version of the Sternberg task. Participants memorized two lists of words that were 
simultaneously presented on the screen. Each list consisted of either one or three words. 
These memory lists were followed by a cue that indicated which of the two lists was rele-
vant for a recognition test, thus signifying that the uncued list could be forgotten. After a 
variable interval, participants responded whether a memory probe was a member of the 
to-be-remembered list. This study yielded two important findings. First, the effect of irrel-
evant-list-length (that is, slower response times to the memory probe when the irrelevant 
list was longer) persisted for less than 1 s, suggesting that it might take only one second to 
remove the uncued items from the region of direct access. Secondly, response times to the 
memory probe were slower when the memory probe was from the to-be-forgotten list than 
when memory probe was a new word (not included in either list) and this effect was pres-
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ent even after 5 s from the presentation of the cue, suggesting that uncued items were not 
completely forgotten after they had been removed from the region of direct access. These 
findings were taken as evidence of a transition from the region of direct access to activated 
part of LTM. According to this account, the uncued items were activated above baseline in 
LTM long after they were removed from the region of direct access and thus they could still 
intrude in responding to the probe. 
Support for a single-item focus of attention is provided by findings showing that a re-
quirement to switch the focus of attention between mental representations in WM leads to 
the switching costs (Oberauer, 2003). In a study reported by Oberauer (2003), participants 
were asked to maintain up to 4 digits in memory, thus the set size of digits did not exceed the 
capacity limit of WM. Subsequently, they performed a sequence of arithmetic operations on 
them. In each step, the spatial location or the color of the digit indicated which of the digits 
had to be accessed in WM and modified by addition or subtraction (e.g. 4; + 3). Participants 
typed their response after each operation. For memory sets larger than one, the digit to 
which the operation had to be applied could be the same as the previous digit (no object 
switch) or it could be different (object switch). The results showed that when participants 
had to use the same digit in WM to perform the calculation, the reactions times were faster 
compared to when participants had to access a different digit. These switching costs in-
creased with memory set size. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the notion 
that the focus of attention is a state reserved for only one item at a time as the requirement 
to focus attention on a new item is associated with time costs, even when this item is acti-
vated in WM. Recent studies investigating the relationship between WM representations 
and visual attention provide further support for the assumption that attention can only be 
focused on a single item at a time in WM. Specifically, these studies have shown that when 
participants are required to look for two targets simultaneously, search times are slower 
compared when they need to look for only one target (Houtkamp & Roelfsema, 2009; Men-
neer, Barrett, Phillips, Donnelly, & Cave, 2007). 
The models proposed by Oberauer (2002, 2009) and Cowan (1995; 2008; 2011) are 
also compatible with an account of WM activation proposed by Olivers at al. (Olivers et al., 
2011). According to this account, WM representations can be held in an active or an accesso-
ry state depending on their relevance. Consistent with Oberauer’s proposal of a single-item 
focus of attention, the account of Olivers assumes that the unique active state is reserved for 
a search template, of which there can be only one at a time. The items held in an accessory 
state are not relevant to the task at hand and have a more passive state with little or no in-
fluence on visual selection because the item held in an active state can block the accessory 
items from influencing attentional selection. The different states of representations in WM 
are illustrated in Fig.1.   
6Fig.1. Different states of representations in WM. cowan’s model distinguished two states in WM: a 
state referred as activated part of long-term memory (grey nodes) and a focus of attention state that can 
be adopted only by up to four items (purple area). In oberauer’s model there are three possible states in 
WM: activated part of long-term memory (grey nodes); capacity-limited state of direct access (purple area) 
and a focus of attention state limited to one item at a time (pink area). oliver’s model assumes that unique 
focus of attention state is reserved for a single search template (pink area). the search template exerts a 
strong influence on visual selection (sharp letter at the bottom). other representations in WM can be held 
in accessory state (purple area). the strong search template push accessory items to a state with little to 
no influence on selection (blurry letter c at the bottom).  
Relationship between attention and working memory
Although the role of attention in encoding, maintenance, and manipulation of WM 
representations is still under intensive investigation, there is no doubt that attention and 
WM interact closely with each other and that they overlap in their functions (Awh et al., 
2006; Awh & Jonides, 2001; Chun, 2011; Corbetta, Kincade, & Shulman, 2002; Gazzaley & 
Nobre, 2012; Kiyonaga & Egner, 2013; Postle, 2006). In this subsection, I will first describe 
an elementary function of attention. Secondly, I will discuss the functional overlap between 
attention and WM.    
The primary function of attention is to enable the selection of information that is rel-
evant for our current goals. Such selection can occur both during perception, and during 
the maintenance of information in WM. With regard to perception, the processing of infor-
mation has to be selective because there is too much information available in our environ-
ment and not everything can be processed by our cognitive system. Because of its selective 
function, attention can be described as a gateway to WM, such that attentional selection can 
lead to encoding and maintenance in WM. A number of studies have demonstrated that 
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processing (Hillyard, Vogel, & Luck, 1998; Luck, Woodman, & Vogel, 2000; Vogel, Luck, 
& Shapiro, 1998). Specifically, psychophysical and neuroimaging studies have shown that 
perceptual enhancement of attended stimuli is associated with amplified responses of corti-
cal areas specialized for processing information related to the selected attribute  (Corbetta, 
Miezin, Dobmeyer, & Shulman, 1990; Hillyard et al., 1998; Luck & Hillyard, 1994). At the 
behavioral level, attention cued to the location of a subsequent target improves target de-
tection and discrimination ( Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Posner, 1980; Posner & Petersen, 
1990) whereas targets that appear outside of attention often go undetected, as illustrated 
by research on change detection (Rensink, 2002; Simons & Rensink, 2005), inattentional 
blindness (Nakayama, Deutsch, & Nakayama, 1999; Simons & Chabris, 1999) and the at-
tentional blink (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992; E. Vogel et al., 1998). For example, the 
attentional blink refers to a drastic impairment in the detection of a second target in rapid 
serial visual presentation (RSVP), which occurs when the second target is displayed within 
200 – 500 ms after the first target (Raymond et al., 1992). According to one current view, the 
attentional blink occurs because the processing of a first target results in delayed attentional 
engagement for ensuing targets, thus preventing such targets from being attended and en-
coded in a consciously accessible form in WM (Nieuwenstein, Van der Burg, Theeuwes, Wy-
ble, & Potter, 2009; Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, 2009). Taken together, these results 
demonstrate that attention allows for the selection of potentially relevant perceptual inputs 
and that such selection not only enhances the perceptual processing of such inputs, but also 
increases the likelihood that such inputs will be encoded in WM. 
Aside from selection during perception, attention can also operate on information rep-
resented in WM. A shift of attention within WM enables selection of mental representations 
for further processing (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Griffin & Nobre, 2003; Makovski, Suss-
man, & Jiang, 2008; Matsukura, Luck, & Vecera, 2007). Recent findings suggest that the 
consequences of shifting of attention within WM are functionally and neurally analogous to 
those of shifting of attention in perception (Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2011; Dell’Acqua, Sessa, 
Toffanin, Luria, & Jolicœur, 2010; Tamber-Rosenau, Esterman, Chiu, & Yantis, 2011). The 
selected objects are prioritized for carrying out ongoing process. The studies investigating 
the nature of such a prioritization suggest that selecting a subset of items in WM might 
be associated with an increase in the fidelity of their representation (Makovski & Pertzov, 
2015; Williams, Hong, Kang, Carlisle, & Woodman, 2013), with the strengthening/refresh-
ing of their memory traces (Rerko & Oberauer, 2013; Souza & Oberauer, 2016) and with 
protection from deterioration due to interference or decay (Pertzov, Bays, Joseph, & Husain, 
2013; Souza, Rerko, & Oberauer, 2016). Thus, orienting attention to mental representations 
improves their quality and increases the likelihood that these representations will be suc-
cessfully remembered.  
A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that the selective function of attention 
is also closely linked to WM processes. For instance, evidence for the role of attention in 
rehearsal in spatial WM was provided by Awh et al. (1998), who showed faster processing of 
stimuli that appeared at a location that was to be held active in spatial WM. Moreover, the 
results of this study also showed that accuracy in the spatial WM task – that is, the ability 
for participants to remember a location in space correctly – was impaired when participants 
were forced to shift attention away from the location that corresponded to the memorized 
8location. Based on these findings, Awh and colleagues concluded that the maintenance of 
spatial information in WM relies on the concurrent allocation of spatial attention to the cor-
responding location. In further support of this conclusion, evidence from functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) has shown that engaging in a spatial WM task modulates 
activity in early visual areas located contralaterally to the memorized location. Likewise, 
evidence from event-related potentials (ERPs) has shown that attention is allocated at mem-
orized locations (for a review see,  Awh & Jonides, 2001).  
Taken together, the main function of the attentional system is the selection of relevant 
information. The studies described above suggest that attentional selection within WM is a 
crucial component in the retention of representations in WM. These data are in accordance 
with state-based accounts assuming that focusing attention on a mental representation 
leads to stronger activation of that representation, which in turn improves the retention of 
that representation in WM (Cowan, 2011; Lepsien & Nobre, 2007; Lewis-Peacock & Postle, 
2012; Oberauer, 2013; Olivers et al., 2011).  
 Control of selection: Top-down versus bottom-up 
The selection of information based on concurrent maintenance of corresponding infor-
mation (Awh et al., 1998) can be considered as an example of top-down selection. Attention-
al selection can be controlled voluntarily, by top-down mechanisms, or involuntarily, by the 
salience of sensory information in our environment.  For example, top-down (goal-driven) 
control navigates selection in a task that requires searching for an object. In a typical search 
task, observers are first asked to remember a specific target and they are then asked to look 
for this target among a number of distracting items (Houtkamp & Roelfsema, 2009; Wolfe, 
1994, 2006). The search-template of the target is assumed to be activated in WM so as to 
bias attention towards a relevant object in the visual display (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). In 
this way, we are able to accomplish many visual search tasks of everyday life such as looking 
for a sweater in the wardrobe, searching for one’s cell-phone, or finding one’s favorite sham-
poo in a shop. In all these situations, internal representations guide visual attention towards 
matching items in the visual field (Wolfe, 1994, 2006). 
Whereas attention can be allocated to certain inputs voluntarily according to the cur-
rent goals, attention can also be captured involuntarily in a stimulus-driven manner (Awh et 
al., 2012; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Egeth & Yantis, 1997; Theeuwes, 2010). The propul-
sive force behind stimulus-driven (bottom-up) attentional capture is the salience of stimuli 
in our environment. Attention prioritizes stimuli that differ significantly with surrounding 
inputs, for example, a red bar among green bars. From an evolutionary perspective, bot-
tom-up selection enables an organism to detect inputs that are potentially relevant or dan-
gerous. 
The distinction between top-down versus bottom-up control of attentional selection 
is not always clear. For example, there is a debate on whether attentional capture by salient 
stimuli can be governed by top-down control (Belopolsky, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2010; Folk, 
Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Remington, 2001; Schreij, Owens, & Theeuwes, 2008). Ac-
cording to the contingent capture account, attentional capture by salient stimuli depends 
on top-down factors such as current search goals. Support for this account can be found in 
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a study by Folk et al. (1992), in which participants were asked to search for a target stim-
ulus defined by color or abrupt onset. The search task was preceded by the presentation 
of a salient cue which could match the target property. The critical finding was that the 
cue captured attention only when it matched the target property (e.g., an irrelevant red cue 
attracted attention when participants searched for a red target but not when they searched 
for a target defined by abrupt onset). This finding led Folk and coauthors to conclude that 
attentional capture by a salient stimulus does not reflect a completely bottom-up process, 
as it is modulated by top-down attentional control. In contrast to this account, Belopolsky, 
Schreij and Theeuwes (2010) used a paradigm very similar to paradigm developed by Folk et 
al. (1992) and they provided evidence that top-down control does not influence attentional 
capture by salient stimuli. Contrary to the study by Folk et al., in which the target property 
was kept fixed over the whole block of trials, the participants in the study by Belopolsky 
et al. were cued at the beginning of trial whether they should search for a target defined 
by color or a target defined by abrupt onset. In addition, there was a neutral condition, in 
which the cue indicated that the target was equally likely to be defined in terms of color or 
abrupt onset. The results of Belopolsky et al. showed that a subsequently presented, salient 
cue attracted attention regardless of whether it matched the target-defining property. Fur-
thermore, an analysis of inter-trial effects revealed that when the property of the upcoming 
target was unknown, the target property from the previous trial determined whether a cue 
would capture attention in the current trial.  In light of these findings, Belopolsky et al. con-
cluded that top-down control cannot prevent capture by task-irrelevant, salient singletons. 
Secondly, Belopolsky et al. argued that the contingent capture effect in the study by Folk et 
al., in which the target-defining property was kept fixed in each block, could be in fact the 
result of inter-trial priming rather than a consequence of top-down control.   
To sum up, attention can be directed according to one’s current goals, in a top-down 
manner or it can be captured automatically by external stimuli that stand out from the 
background. Automatic bottom-up selection occurs even when the salient stimulus does not 
match the representation held in WM.   
Working-memory based guidance of visual attention
Most theories of visual selection postulate that representations of search targets (at-
tentional templates) in WM guide attention towards relevant perceptual input (Desimone 
& Duncan, 1995; Houtkamp & Roelfsema, 2009; Wolfe, 1994, 2006). Hence, an ability to 
prioritize targets by maintaining internal representations of such targets is crucial for the 
execution of any task that requires goal-driven attentional selection.  However, people some-
times keep in mind information that is not directly relevant for a current task. What are 
the behavioral consequences of having such irrelevant information in memory? This ques-
tion received much attention in recent years because it addresses the important question of 
whether retention of information in WM automatically results in selection of corresponding 
information in the environment. Many observations have shown that indeed items in WM 
may guide selective attention even when they are not relevant to the task at hand and even 
when it is detrimental to the task at hand (Downing, 2000; Gao et al., 2016; Olivers et al., 
2006; Pan, 2010; Pashler & Shiu, 1999; Soto et al., 2011, 2005). Downing (2000) was one 
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of the first to demonstrate that information in WM can guide selection.  In this study, par-
ticipants were instructed to memorize a face at the beginning of each trial. While holding 
a representation of this face in WM, they were asked to perform a probe discrimination 
task. Directly before the probe display, two faces were briefly shown on the screen. One 
of the faces was the same as the face stored in memory and the other was novel. Perfor-
mance in the probe discrimination task was better when the probe appeared at the location 
of the memory-matching face. From this finding, Downing concluded that visual attention 
was automatically drawn to the location of the face that matched the representation held 
in WM. Consistent with this conclusion, later studies provided converging evidence for the 
memory-driven attentional capture hypothesis (Soto et al., 2008). For instance, Soto and 
colleagues (2005) demonstrated that memory-driven capture could induce both costs and 
benefits in a search task. In this study, participants memorized a colored shape, which was 
followed by a search display of four colored shapes. Each of three shapes contained a distrac-
tor and one shape contained the target. Reaction times for the target were slower when one 
of the shapes containing a distractor matched the shape held in WM than when none of the 
shapes matched this shape, thus reflecting costs in search performance. In contrast, when 
the target was embedded in the same shape as that held in WM, search times were faster 
relative to a baseline condition, thus reflecting benefits in search performance. Furthermore, 
the cost of attentional capture by WM matching object were found even when the matching 
object always contained a distractor line. These findings suggest that visual attention is di-
rected towards items that match the contents of WM, even when such allocation of attention 
is detrimental to the execution of the current task. 
One question raised in the context of research on memory-driven attentional capture 
is whether this effect is truly caused by an active representation in WM or whether it might 
be better accounted for in terms of a priming effect, that is, the facilitation of the processing 
of a stimulus due to the prior presentation of a stimulus that is perceptually or semantically 
identical or related (Kristjánsson & Campana, 2010). To address this question, Soto and col-
leagues used their standard memory-driven capture paradigm and added a mere repetition 
condition in which participants did not have to remember the object that was presented at 
the beginning of the trial (Soto et al., 2005). In this case, the results showed no evidence 
of capture, thus suggesting that the cause of memory-driven capture indeed stems from 
holding the object in WM, and not from priming (see also, Kumar, Soto, & Humphreys, 
2009; Soto, Humphreys, & Rotshtein, 2007). More evidence supporting the claim that ac-
tive maintenance of an item in WM is essential to observe memory-driven capture comes 
from a study showing that when a visual search task is presented after memory test, selec-
tion is not affected by a matching distractor (Olivers et al., 2006). Assuming that the item 
in WM would no longer be actively maintained after the memory task, this finding suggests 
that maintenance of an item in WM is required for a bias of attention towards that item. 
Interestingly, the guidance of attention by WM has been also demonstrated to occur 
by an object that constitutes a different exemplar of the category to which an object held 
in WM  belongs (Balani, Soto, & Humphreys, 2010). In the study by Balani and colleagues, 
participants had to hold in WM a particular exemplar from a certain category (e.g., a Ben-
gal cat) for a later memory test. The same exemplar or a different exemplar (e.g., a Persian 
cat) of this category could then reappear as a distractor in a search task. The results showed 
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that the different exemplar attracted visual attention to the same extent as the same exem-
plar. Furthermore, a subsequent experiment showed that this capture effect was also present 
when a word corresponding to an object held in WM was presented in the search display 
instead of a picture. These findings suggest that a WM-matching distractor does not have to 
be presented in the exact same form to capture attention.        
As described above, there is ample evidence that items represented in WM can guide 
attentional selection. However, there are also conditions under which such memory-driv-
en guidance of attention is not observed, such that several conditions have been identified 
in which memory-driven capture is reduced or abolished. For instance, a requirement to 
search for a different target on each trial leads to an elimination of guidance by irrelevant 
items held in WM (Olivers, 2009), and this is thought to occur because changing the target 
of search on every trial increases the need to actively maintain a template of that target in 
WM (Carlisle, Arita, Pardo, & Woodman, 2011). In explaining these findings, it has thus 
been suggested that holding a search template active in WM will prevent a memory-driven 
capture effect for items that match the representation of other, irrelevant objects in WM 
(Downing & Dodds, 2004; Houtkamp & Roelfsema, 2006; Olivers et al., 2011). Such results 
concur well with WM models postulating that only one item at the time can be in the focus 
of attention in WM (Oberauer, 2002, 2013; Olivers et al., 2011). 
Another factor that influences the occurrence of memory-driven capture is WM load, 
that is, the number of items held in WM at the same time (Soto & Humphreys, 2008; Zhang, 
Zhang, Huang, Kong, & Wang, 2011). For instance, Zhang et al. (2011) showed that guidance 
of attention by WM is eliminated when WM load increased from one to four objects. An 
explanation for this result is that when four items are maintained in WM, it is unlikely that 
one of these items will be prioritized over other items; hence, it is unlikely that it will receive 
a special status in the focus of attention.  
Taken together, the memory-driven capture effect documented in numerous studies 
provides evidence for a dynamic interaction between activations in WM and visual selection. 
Moreover, this interaction seems to be shaped by task demands. Such observations can be 
interpreted in terms of models assuming that different states of activation in WM have dif-
ferent consequences for the selection of sensory information.      
How working memory forgets      
In memory research, forgetting often has a negative connotation. Indeed, when the 
information we want to remember is lost, we conceptualize forgetting as a failure of mem-
ory. However, the ability to forget information that we do not want to keep in memory is 
essential for a severely capacity-limited WM (Cowan, 2010; Luck & Vogel, 1997). That is, a 
fundamental requirement for its efficient use is to maintain only relevant information and to 
avoid the unnecessary use of WM capacity for the retention of information that is no longer 
relevant. The extent to which people are able to selectively maintain and forget information 
in WM, and how this affects the resulting representations, has been studied extensively us-
ing the retro-cue paradigm (Griffin & Nobre, 2003; Makovski, 2012; Makovski et al., 2008; 
Murray, Nobre, Clark, Cravo, & Stokes, 2013). In this paradigm, a spatial cue is presented 
after participants have first encoded a memory set of visual objects in WM. The cue indicates 
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which object(s) have to be maintained in memory, and which can be forgotten. Compared 
to an uncued condition in which all items need to be remembered, the results for such a 
retro-cue condition show a benefit in retention of cued items (Gunseli et al., 2014; Land-
man, Spekreijse, & Lamme, 2003; Pertzov, Bays, Joseph, & Husain, 2013; Souza, Rerko, & 
Oberauer, 2014, 2016). In a recent review, Souza and Oberauer (2016) discussed several hy-
potheses that have been proposed in the literature to explain the origin of retro-cue benefits. 
These hypotheses explain retro-cue advantage in terms of attentional strengthening or re-
freshing (Nobre, Griffin, & Rao, 2007; Rerko & Oberauer, 2013; Souza, Rerko, & Oberauer, 
2015), protection from perceptual interference (Matsukura et al., 2007; Souza et al., 2016), 
prioritization for comparison (Makovski et al., 2008), a retrieval head-start (Souza et al., 
2015), protection from time-based decay (Pertzov et al., 2013) or removal of no longer rel-
evant items (Kuo, Stokes, & Nobre, 2012; Souza et al., 2014). These alternative hypotheses 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may combine to account for the retro-cue effect.  
Although evidence suggest that removal of uncued items is an important contributor to 
retro-cue benefits (Souza et al., 2014; Williams & Woodman, 2012), so far most of the stud-
ies focused on testing memory for cued items, and only a few studies have examined directly 
the fate of items that were uncued, and thus irrelevant for the task at hand. In these few 
studies, participants were asked to memorize two objects, of which one was subsequently 
cued to be forgotten whereas the other had to be retained. Soon afterward, the participant’s 
memory for the to-be-forgotten item was tested in implicit or explicit manner. The results of 
these studies suggest that the uncued, no longer relevant object is completely expelled from 
WM, such that observers failed to recall this object when explicitly tested and it also did not 
attract attention in a visual task (Olivers et al., 2006; van Moorselaar, Olivers, Theeuwes, 
Lamme, & Sligte, 2015; Williams, Hong, Kang, Carlisle, & Woodman, 2013). 
What do we know about the mechanisms that underlie the forgetting of information 
that is no longer needed for the task at hand? The time-based decay theories and the inter-
ference theories were developed to explain the limitation in WM capacity, hence addressing 
why the information we do want to keep in WM is sometimes forgotten. However, the same 
theories also address the fate of the no longer relevant representations. Time-based decay 
theories propose that memory traces simply decay over time (Barrouillet & Camos, 2012). 
The decay can be averted by attention-based refreshing process such as a covert or overt 
rehearsal of information. The requirement to engage in processing of concurrent operation 
prevents refreshing process. Thus whenever there is time between processing episodes, the 
to-be-remembered information can be refreshed. The information in WM that is not pro-
tected by refreshing will fade away over time (Barrouillet & Camos, 2012; Barrouillet et al., 
2004). Thus, according to decay-theories, the retro-cue effect could occur through selective 
maintenance and rehearsal of the cued items, with the uncued items showing decay due to 
the lack of rehearsal. 
Another account of the retro-cuing effect on to-be-remembered and to-be-forgotten 
items can be found in the family of interference theories that assume that forgetting of in-
formation that we want to remember occurs because of interference between representa-
tions in WM (Lewandowsky et al., 2009; Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2014; Oberauer et al., 
2012). In the interference-based model of performance in a complex span task (Oberauer 
& Lewandowsky, 2014, 2016; Oberauer & Lin, 2017), encoding information in WM is com-
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putationally implemented as a Hebbian learning rule. Specifically, this model consists of a 
two-layer neural network in which one layer represents items and another layer represents 
associated positions or context markers. Encoding items in the network is accomplished 
via Hebbian learning, that is, through a modification of connection weights between two 
layers. The interference between WM representations can arise from confusion between 
items that are linked to the similar or overlapping context or by superposition when en-
coding of multiple item-position bindings within the same matrix of connection weights 
leads to reciprocal distortion of representations (Oberauer, Farrell, Jarrold, Pasiecznik, & 
Greaves, 2012). Interference can occur between relevant and irrelevant WM content. For 
instance, the irrelevant content is activated in WM when there is requirement to perform 
concurrent distracting task. Whereas time-based decay theories are equipped with atten-
tion-based rehearsal mechanism, the interference-based model is equipped with removal 
mechanism, that is, this model assumes that representations that are no longer relevant 
are removed from WM to free capacity and to avoid the possibility that they could interfere 
with the retention of relevant material (Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Oberauer, 2014; Oberau-
er & Lewandowsky, 2014, 2016; Oberauer et al., 2012). For instance, in a complex span 
task, encoding of to-be-remembered item alternates with another task such as solving an 
arithmetic equation. According to interference-based model of complex-span task, once the 
arithmetic equation is solved, the no longer relevant digit representations are removed from 
WM if there is a time gap before encoding the new to-be-remembered item (Oberauer et al., 
2012). The removal of no longer relevant content is accomplished via Hebbian antilearning, 
in which representations are unbound from their context. Taken together, interference ac-
counts propose that the main reason for forgetting is interference between WM activations 
and they assume the existence of an active removal process that can operate in accordance 
with task-instructions about the relevance of previously studied materials, and that can thus 
protect the limited capacity of WM from being loaded with no longer relevant information. 
 Outline of the thesis
Recent models of WM promote the notion that information in WM can exist in multi-
ple representational states, which can be adopted and reconfigured dynamically to adjust for 
the task demands (Cowan, 2011; Larocque et al., 2014; Oberauer, 2002; Olivers et al., 2011). 
Attention plays a primary role not only in a selection of information from the external envi-
ronment, but also in modulation of representational states of WM by selectively prioritizing 
information within WM in accordance to its relevance (Myers, Stokes, & Nobre, 2017). The 
relationship between attention and WM is not limited to the role of attention in the selection 
of information that has to be encoded or maintained in WM. In fact, recent studies provided 
abundant evidence for functional reciprocity between WM and attention and their strong 
interconnection (Awh, Vogel, & Oh, 2006; Awh & Jonides, 2001; Corbetta, Kincade, & Shul-
man, 2002; Postle, 2006). For instance, such interconnection between WM and attention is 
manifested by the effect of guidance of attention by WM content even when such guidance 
always harm performance in the task at hand (Downing, 2000; Olivers et al., 2006; Soto & 
Humphreys, 2007; van Moorselaar, Battistoni, Theeuwes, & Olivers, 2015). Although a lot 
of research has been devoted to understanding how WM and attention interact (Awh et al., 
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2006; Corbetta et al., 2002; Postle, 2006), there are still many remaining questions. This 
thesis addressed some of these questions by using memory-driven attentional capture effect 
as a tool to examine how WM fluctuates across various task conditions. 
A first question concerns the extent to which memory-driven capture requires active 
maintenance of information in WM. Previous findings suggest that memory-driven atten-
tional capture requires active, goal-driven maintenance of an item in WM (Kiyonaga & Eg-
ner, 2013; Olivers et al., 2006). In contrary, other studies found that external attention can 
be guided by recently processed items even when there is no requirement to maintain this 
item in memory (Pashler & Shiu, 1999; Soto & Humphreys, 2007). The studies documented 
in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provided further insights into attentional capture by recently 
processed items. Specifically, in the study reported in Chapter 2, we investigated whether the 
depth of encoding of recently processed words influences the deployment of visual attention 
towards corresponding pictures in a subsequent visual task. In the study described in Chap-
ter 3, we directly compared the capture effects elicited by residual and active maintenance 
of information in WM, and we examined how these effects are influenced by a secondary 
arithmetic task 
The study documented in Chapter 4 examined intentional forgetting of information 
held in WM. Many studies have shown that selection of representations in WM results in 
better memory for selected representations compared to when all representations have to be 
maintained in WM (Makovski et al., 2008; Nobre et al., 2007; Souza et al., 2016). This effect 
can be explained in terms of removal of the unselected representations (Kuo et al., 2012; 
Souza et al., 2014). Such active removal mechanism was proposed by interference-based 
models described in previous subsection (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2014, 2016; Oberauer 
et al., 2012). However previous studies on directed forgetting in WM (Williams et al., 2013; 
Williams & Woodman, 2012) did not offer a direct test of removal account as removal in 
these studies could be explained by selective remembering rather than intentional deac-
tivation of the no-longer-relevant items. To provide a more direct test of the possibility of 
intentional forgetting in WM, we investigated whether people can intentionally forget a sin-
gle object currently held in WM and we examined the time course of any such cue-induced 
forgetting by manipulating the time interval following the instruction to forget. 
The study documented in Chapter 5 tested and compared the extent to which partic-
ipants are able to select only one of two features of an object during maintenance in WM 
and in encoding information into WM during perception. Previous studies have shown that 
people are capable to selectively remember subset of items currently held in WM (Williams 
& Woodman, 2012). However, little is known about a selection of particular features of an 
object held in WM. The study documented in Chapter 5 was designed to investigate whether 
people can selectively remember an individual feature of an object held in WM and whether 
such selective remembering involves loss of irrelevant feature. To address these questions 
participants memorized colored shape which was followed by retro-cue indicating whether 
the color or the shape of the object should be remembered. To test the selection of object 
features in perception, the cue informing which feature is relevant was presented before the 
colored shape.
Lastly, Chapter 6 sums up the main findings of the current work and discusses implica-
tions of these findings for the ongoing debates in the field. 
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The role of depth 
of encoding in attentional capture

 Abstract
The aim of the current study was to examine whether depth of encoding influences attentional 
capture by recently attended objects. In Experiment 1, participants first had to judge whether a 
word referred to a living or a non-living thing (deep encoding condition) or whether the word 
was written in lower- or uppercase (shallow encoding condition), and they then had to identify 
a digit displayed midway in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream of eight pictures. 
A picture corresponding to the previously processed word was presented either before or after 
the target digit. The results showed that this picture captured attention, thus resulting in an 
attentional blink for identification of a target digit, in the deep encoding condition but not in 
the shallow encoding condition. In Experiment 2, this capture effect was found to be abolished 
when an additional working-memory (WM) task was performed directly after the word judg-
ment task, suggesting that the capture effect stemmed from residual WM activation that could 
be erased by means of a secondary WM task. Taken together, these results suggest that deep 
and shallow encoding result in different degrees of WM activation which in turn influences the 
likelihood of memory-driven attentional capture.
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Working memory (WM) is needed to maintain task goals and the information relevant 
to achieving these goals (Baddeley, 2010; Carlisle, Arita, Pardo, & Woodman, 2011; Cowan, 
2005). The limited capacity of WM requires that pertinent information be attended, and that 
irrelevant information be inhibited (e.g., Cowan, 2010). Given the role of WM in the control 
of intentional acts, it is not surprising that attention and WM are strongly intertwined (Awh 
& Jonides, 2001; Awh, Vogel & Oh, 2006). Indeed, there is evidence from visual search stud-
ies that it can be hard to ignore distractor objects when they match representations held in 
WM (e.g., Downing, 2000). For example, Soto and colleagues (Soto, Heinke, Humphreys, & 
Blanco, 2005; Soto, Humphreys, & Heinke, 2006) found that reaction times in a search task 
were slower when one of the distractors in the search array shared a feature with an item 
that was retained in working memory, indicating that attention can be captured by items 
that match an item held in memory, despite its irrelevance to current task goals. 
The finding that information held in WM can influence visual selection is consistent 
with Pillsbury’s (1908) hypothesis that searching for anything requires forming a mental 
image of the target. Pashler and Shiu (1999) tested whether imagining an item would trig-
ger search even when such search impairs performance on a current task. In this study, 
participants were asked to identify a digit target that was embedded in an RSVP sequence 
of pictures and that could be preceded or followed by a picture of a previously imagined ob-
ject. The results showed that digit identification was impaired when this picture was shown 
before the digit target, suggesting that the picture captured attention, thereby causing an 
attentional blink (i.e., less accurate detection of a target when it follows within less than 500 
ms from a preceding target or capture stimulus; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992; see also, 
Nieuwenstein, Van der Burg, Theeuwes, Wyble, & Potter, 2009). Pashler and Shiu’s results 
can therefore be taken as support for Pillsbury’s hypothesis that forming a mental image is 
sufficient to instigate a bias towards attending that object when it is subsequently encoun-
tered again. Importantly, Pashler and Shiu also found that attention was still directed to a 
picture of a previously imagined object even when the instructions encouraged participants 
to discard the mental image. To the extent that this instruction could lead participants to 
intentionally discard and thus forget the imagined object (see e.g., Vogel, McCollough, & 
Machizawa, 2005), this finding suggests that the recent activation of an item may be suf-
ficient to elicit the attentional capture effect. Therefore, one explanation for Pashler and 
Shiu’s (1999) finding of attentional capture by an imagined object is that the effect is driven 
by residual WM activation of imagined object that persisted through the trial, despite the in-
struction to discard the image. Pashler and Shiu’s results may be then interpreted as support 
for the hypothesis that items that match the content of WM guide visual attention1. 
Although many studies have investigated the conditions under which the maintenance 
of an object in working memory does and does not result in attentional capture (e.g., Olivers, 
Peters, Houtkamp & Roelfsema, 2011), only little is known about the influence of previous 
processing on attentional capture. In the current study, we addressed this matter by investigat-
1 An alternative explanation for this finding is that the capture effect is not due to guidance of attention by residual WM 
activation, but due to priming of word meaning. According to a priming account, any processing that activates an object’s 
representation should be sufficient to cause priming and thus lower the threshold for the subsequent identification of the 
object. Importantly, however, soto et al. (2005) showed that the typical conditions for eliciting priming effects do not lead 
to attentional capture, thus arguing against a priming account of the findings of Pashler and shiu (1999). 
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ing whether depth of encoding influences attentional capture. According to the levels of pro-
cessing framework (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), incoming stimuli can be analyzed to a different 
depth of encoding ranging from shallow, sensory analysis based on structural aspects of the 
word to deeper, semantic analysis involving the retrieval of meaning and implications, and the 
deeper the processing, the better is memory for the processed words (Craik & Tulving, 1975) as 
participants have been found to remember more words if a task requires the analysis of word 
meaning than if the task only requires an analysis of the structural aspects of a written word. 
The current study examined whether depth of encoding influences the deployment of 
selective attention towards previously processed items. Our hypothesis was that the deeper 
the encoding of a word prior to an RSVP trial, the more likely it would be that a picture de-
picting the referent of this word would capture attention in the RSVP stream, even though 
attending to the picture would impair target identification. 
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 addressed whether depth of encoding impacts the likelihood of atten-
tional capture by a previously processed word. This was done by comparing the attentional 
capture effects for pictures that matched a word that had either undergone deep or shal-
low encoding. In the deep-encoding condition, participants made an animacy judgment for 
a word, whereas the shallow-encoding condition required participants to judge whether a 
word was printed in upper or lower case. To determine whether the manipulation of depth 
of encoding was effective, we included an incidental memory test at the end of study which 
aimed to determine whether participants could remember the previously processed words 
better if they had undergone deep as opposed to shallow encoding.
Method
Participants. Forty-three students enrolled in the English language Psychology bache-
lor program at the University of Groningen participated in the experiment for partial course 
credit and an additional 16 volunteers from the University of Groningen community were 
paid in exchange for their participation.  All participants had normal or corrected to normal 
visual acuity (42 females; M = 22.9 years ; SD = 5.65). The study was approved by the Ethics 
Committee of the Psychology Department. Informed written consent was obtained.
Apparatus and Stimuli. Stimulus presentation and response collection were con-
trolled by a program written with E-prime 2.0 (Schneider, Eschmann, & Zuccolotto, 2002) 
and the experiment was done on computers that were fitted with 22-inch CRT computer 
monitors with a refresh rate of 100 Hz and a resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels. 
The word stimuli used in the experiment were 120 high frequency English nouns of high 
imageability [479-655 (M= 593.88) according to the Paivio (1968) norms]. The English Lex-
icon Project (ELP) database (Balota et al., 2007) was used to select words of high frequency 
according to the Hyperspace Analogue to Language (HAL) frequency norms (Lund & Bur-
gess, 1996). We selected words that had a frequency of 20 per million or greater (Brysbaert & 
New, 2009) and that were familiar to the participants in our study. All words were displayed in 
Courier New, 20-point font. The picture stimuli were line drawings taken from the Snodgrass 
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and Vanderwart (1980) and International Picture Naming Project (IPNP) sets (Szekely et al., 
2005). Drawings of 209 nouns were used as stimuli in the experiment (129 as fillers and 80 as 
targets or fillers in the RSVP stream), and each measured approximately 9.5 x 9.5 cm (7.76° of 
visual angle). Word stimuli presented in the experimental task were composed of the names of 
the 80 target pictures. Words were generated from the pool of 40 words used in the animacy 
judgment task (20 living and 20 non-livings) and 40 words used in the case judgment task (20 
uppercase and 20 lowercase). Each subset of words used in the case judgment task contained 
10 living and 10 non-living words. An additional 32 words were selected for a practice blocks. 
The digits 2-9 were used as target digits and were presented in 40-point Courier New font 
(measuring 0.42° of visual angle horizontally and 0.82° vertically). The pattern mask follow-
ing the digit was composed of randomly distributed black lines and measured 2  2 cm (1.62° 
of visual angle). An additional 36 pictures were selected for a practice block. All stimuli were 
displayed in black on a white background at the center of the screen.
Procedure. The experimental task was preceded by a practice phase in which the word 
and digit tasks were practiced in isolation. In the 32-trial digit practice phase, participants 
viewed RSVP streams of eight pictures (presented for 120 ms each) with a masked target digit 
shown after the fourth picture in the sequence. The participant’s task was to identify the target 
digit by typing it in after the presentation of the RSVP stream. Feedback was given after each 
response by displaying the correct response. The duration of the digit was set to 110 ms initially 
and the duration of the mask was set to 20 ms. During the practice trials, whenever the correct 
answer was given three times in a row the digit presentation time was reduced by 20 ms and 
the duration of the mask was increased by 20 ms. If the next three trials again each yielded a 
correct answer, the presentation time of the digit was again reduced, but now by 10 ms and the 
mask duration increased by 10 ms. Whenever an incorrect answer was given three times in a 
row, the duration of the digit was likewise increased by 20 or 10 ms (and the mask duration 
decreased by 20 or 10 ms, respectively). The target duration at the end of the practice trials 
was used as the initial duration for digit presentation during the experimental trials. The word 
practice phase included separate blocks for the animacy and case judgment tasks. One block 
of 16 trials of each task was completed, with the order of the blocks counterbalanced across 
subjects. Words were presented one at a time and participants had to make an animacy or case 
judgment as accurately and as quickly as possible. After each response, feedback was provided 
indicating whether the response was correct or incorrect. 
In the experimental phase subjects performed both the word-judgment and digit iden-
tification tasks on each trial. The experimental phase was blocked, with approximately half 
the participants performing the animacy judgment task first and the other half performing 
the case judgment task first. Participants were asked to focus only on reporting the digit 
after having completed the word task. The words used for the animacy and case judgment 
tasks were selected at random from the set of available words.
At the beginning of each trial the word to be judged appeared on the screen. Participants 
responded by pressing the “c” key for words that referred to living beings or words printed in 
lowercase and the “m” key for non-living things or words printed in uppercase. Next, there 
was a 500-ms fixation period. Ten objects were then presented in an RSVP stream: four 
pictures, the target digit and its mask, and another four pictures. The critical picture (the 
picture corresponding to the word seen at the beginning of the trial) was presented in posi-
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tion 3 or 7 and the digit and its mask occupied positions 5 of the RSVP sequence. After the 
sequence finished, participants responded by typing in the digit they identified. The correct 
digit response was then provided as feedback. During the experimental trials, the duration 
of the target digit and its mask was adjusted using a similar method as that used during 
practice, with the difference being that target duration was decreased when the accuracy fell 
below 70% or increased when accuracy was above 90% in the last 10 trials. The minimum 
target duration was 20 ms.
After the experimental phase was finished, there was an unexpected recognition test 
that required participants to indicate whether a word had been shown earlier-on in the ex-
periment. During the recognition test, 40 words from the animacy judgment task and 40 
words from the case judgment task were shown randomly intermixed with 40 words which 
had not been presented during the experiment. Words were shown one at a time and each 
word remained in view until participants indicated whether they had seen it before in the 
experiment. The recognition judgment had to be made as accurately and as quickly as possi-
ble. Once the experiment was finished, the participants received the list of words used in the 
experimental blocks and were asked to indicate words whose meaning they did not know. 
If the participant did not know the meaning of a word, the trial containing that word was 
excluded from analysis. A total of 30 such trials (no more than 4 from a given participant) 
were excluded from the entire data set. The entire experiment lasted approximately 30 min. 
Results and Discussion
The average presentation duration of the digit was 43 ms. Animacy judgments in the 
deep processing condition were correct on 93.9% of the trials, and the mean reaction time 
(RT) was 1088 ms. Case judgments in the shallow processing condition were correct on 97.7% 
of the trials, and had a mean RT of 809 ms. The differences in accuracy and RT between the 
two encoding conditions were significant, t(58) = 5.76, p < .001, d = 0.75, and t(58) = 13.81, p < 
.001, d = 1.74, respectively. The analysis of digit identification accuracy was restricted to trials 
in which the animacy or case judgment was correct. A 2 (position of critical picture: 3 or 7) × 2 
(type of task: animacy or case judgment) × 2 (order: animacy judgment or case judgment trials 
first) repeated measures ANOVA was performed on mean accuracy in the digit identification 
task. The only effect to reach significance was the interaction of Task and Position of the Criti-
cal Picture, F(1.28) = 5.17, p = .031,       = .16 (all other F’s < 2.51, all other p’s > .12). A follow-up 
two-tailed pairwise t-test showed significantly lower performance when the critical picture 
preceded the digit (74.4%) than when the critical picture was presented after (79.4%) the digit 
in the deep encoding condition, t(58) = 2.78, p = .007, d = 0.36, but not in the shallow-encod-
ing condition (76.8% vs. 75.9%, t(58) = 0.44, p = .659; see Figure 1). A regression analysis was 
conducted to determine if this capture effect, defined in terms of AB magnitude, depended on 
RT in the word processing task. The analysis revealed that RT on the animacy and case judg-
ment tasks was not a significant predictor of AB ( β = .087, p = .348), accounting less than 1 % 
of variance in the AB magnitude (F (1,116) = 0.888, p = .348, R2 = 0.008). Lastly, the results 
for the recognition memory task yielded d’ = 1.24 for the shallow-encoding condition and d’ = 
2.08 for the deep-encoding condition, reflecting a significant effect of depth of encoding, t(58) 
= 10.62, p < .001, d = 1.3, on recognition memory.  
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Fig.1 experiment 1 mean accuracy in the digit identification task, as a function of encoding condition and 
position of the critical picture. the digit target was presented in position 5. error bars reflect standard 
errors of the mean. 
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 show that pictures of words that had under-
gone deep encoding attracted attention and thereby resulted in an attentional blink effect in 
a subsequent RSVP task. In contrast, we found no evidence of such an attentional capture 
effect for pictures that corresponded to shallowly encoded words. Accordingly, it can be con-
cluded that deep encoding increases the likelihood that an object will capture attention in a 
subsequent task. What remains to be determined, however, is whether this attentional cap-
ture effect indeed arose due to residual WM activation of the words. The goal of Experiment 
2 was to address this matter. 
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we examined whether the attentional capture effect observed in the 
deep encoding of Experiment 1 was driven by residual WM activation. To address this matter, 
we examined if the capture effect would be abolished if participants had to perform an ad-
ditional, demanding WM task directly after judging the word. Specifically, we reasoned that 
if the capture effect stemmed from residual WM activation, then the requirement to encode 
a large amount of new information in WM should abolish this effect because it would erase 
the residual WM activation of the word’s meaning (see also, Zhang, Zhang, Huang, Kong, & 
Wang, 2011). To test this hypothesis, we replicated the deep encoding condition of Experiment 
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Method
Participants. Thirty-three students (19 females; M = 20.2 years; SD = 1.84) of the 
English-language Psychology bachelor program at the University of Groningen participated 
in the experiment for partial course credit. All had normal or corrected-to-normal visual 
acuity. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology Department. 
Informed written consent was obtained.
Apparatus and Stimuli. Apparatus and stimuli were similar to those of Experiment 
1 with the exception that Experiment 2 included an additional WM task. The stimuli for 
this task were similar to the stimuli used by Zhang and colleagues (2011) and consisted of 
shapes that each measured approximately 1.7° x 1.7° in visual angle. Four of these shapes 
were displayed for the WM task on each trial and these shapes were positioned at the corner 
of an imaginary rectangle measuring 5.7° of visual angle horizontally and 4.1° vertically. In 
the memory test a probe shape was presented in the center of the screen and participants 
had to judge whether this shape was present or absent in the memory display. The shape was 
present in the display in 50 % of the trials. 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 1 except for the fol-
lowing. In the experiment, trials differed in whether the animacy task was followed by the 
memory set of four shapes or not. In the condition with this memory task (WM Load con-
dition), the memory set was displayed for 3000 ms directly after participants responded to 
the word. In the condition without this additional WM task (No WM Load condition), the 
animacy task was followed by a 3000-ms blank screen. In both conditions, the RSVP digit 
identification task was presented next. In the WM load condition, the response for the digit 
identification task was followed by a WM test in which a single shape appeared on the screen 
for which participants had to indicate whether present or absent in the memory set. 
Results and Discussion
We excluded 3 participants that performed at chance-level in the WM test. For the 
remaining 30 participants, mean accuracy in memory task was 82.3% correct. The average 
presentation duration of the digit was 50 ms. Animacy judgments were correct on 96.2% 
of the trials, and had a mean RT of 1215 ms. The analysis of digit identification accuracy 
included only those trials in which the animacy judgment task and the memory task – if 
present – were done correctly. A 2 (position of critical picture: 3 or 7) x 2 (WM load: load or 
no load) repeated measures ANOVA was performed on mean accuracy in the digit identifi-
cation task. The main effect of Position of the Critical Picture was significant F(1.29) = 5.67, 
p = .024, 2pm = .16, with lower performance when the critical picture was presented before 
the digit (79.7%) than when the critical picture was presented after the digit (84.0%). There 
was no main effect of WM load, F(1.29) = 0.40, p = .536. Crucially, the interaction between 
Position of the Critical Picture and WM load was significant, F(1.29) = 5.07, p = .032, 2pm
= .15, indicating  that performance was lower when the critical picture preceded the digit 
(78.5%) than when the critical picture was presented after (86.4%) the digit in the no WM 
load condition, t(29) = 3.01, p = .005, d = 0.64, but not in the WM load condition (80.8% vs. 
81.6%, t(29) = 0.37, p = .719). This pattern of results is illustrated in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2 Results experiment 2. Mean accuracy in the digit identification task, shown as a function of WM 
load condition and position of critical picture. the target digit was presented in position 5. error bars reflect 
standard errors of the mean.
Taken together, the results of Experiment 2 replicate the finding of attentional capture 
by a picture that corresponded to a deeply encoded word and they show that this capture ef-
fect was eliminated when encoding of the word was followed by a demanding memory task. 
This finding suggests that the attentional capture effect caused by deep encoding was indeed 
driven by residual WM activation of the encoded word.
General Discussion
In two experiments, the current study examined whether the likelihood of attentional 
capture by a picture depicting a previously processed word depends on whether this word 
had undergone shallow or deep encoding. In Experiment 1, we found that shallow encoding 
of a word did not result in attentional capture even though participants were found to per-
form well above chance in a recognition test for these words. In contrast, deep encoding did 
lead to attentional capture, and this effect was found to be abolished when participants were 
asked to perform a demanding WM task directly after the deep encoding task. 
Taken together, the results of the current study suggest that deep encoding of a word 
leads to memory activation, which in turns biases the allocation of attention towards match-
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was offered by Soto and Humphreys (2007), who found that verbalization of visual primes 
results in a memory-driven capture effect similar to that generated by items that are main-
tained in WM. In this study, participants were asked to verbalize a visual prime or read 
aloud a prime word and after which they performed a visual search for a target. The results 
showed that search times were slower when one of the distractors shared a feature with the 
prime even though there was no instruction to remember the prime. Soto and Humphreys 
concluded that verbalization of the prime leads to WM activation of corresponding concept, 
which in turn biased attention in an unrelated subsequent task. Likewise, it can be argued 
that the animacy judgment task used in the current study led to the activation of the corre-
sponding object in WM, thus resulting in memory-driven attentional capture when a picture 
of the object was later encountered again in the RSVP task. Consistent with this account, 
the results of Experiment 2 showed that the capture effect was abolished by the requirement 
to perform an intermediate WM task, thus suggesting that the residual activation was over-
written by the requirement to fill WM with new information. 
An additional important finding was that the results of the incidental memory test in 
Experiment 1 showed better performance in recognition of deeply than shallowly encoded 
words. Nevertheless, recognition of shallowly encoded words was also well above chance, 
suggesting that the meaning of these words must have been extracted, for else, these words 
could not be recognized in a later memory test. The reason why deep and shallow encoding 
may lead to differences in attentional capture may be understood in view of the notion that 
WM activation may consist of different states (Nee & Jonides, 2011; Oberauer, 2002; Oli-
vers et al., 2011). A particularly relevant account of WM activation can be found in Olivers 
et al., who distinguished between active and accessory WM representations. According to 
this account, the item relevant to the current task gains the status of a search template with 
a full access to sensory input. In contrast, items in WM that are not relevant to the task at 
hand, but which can still influence visual selection, receive a status of “accessory” item. Seen 
in light of this account, we propose that the semantic representations of deeply processed 
words in our task acted as strong accessory items that gained a representational state in WM 
that temporally guided the deployment of attention towards matching stimuli. Furthermore, 
we propose that the reason why shallow encoding did not lead to attentional capture is be-
cause the representations of these words were only weakly activated and therefore unable 
to guide attentional selection. Taken together, our findings can be taken as evidence for the 
relationship between strength of WM activation and the deployment of selective attention. 
To conclude, our study shows that residual WM activation resulting from perform-
ing an animacy judgment task is sufficient to guide attentional selection in a subsequent, 
unrelated RSVP task. Furthermore, we found that even though a case judgment task also 
leads to the activation of semantic information, this activation was too weak to induce atten-
tional capture. Our findings thus illustrate that the attentional capture paradigm developed 
by Pashler and Shiu offers an interesting means for studying residual WM activation. Fu-
ture research will need to address whether the likelihood of attentional capture depends on 
whether information is held in WM actively, or passively as a residue of earlier processing. 
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Previous studies have shown that information held in working memory (WM) actively or 
as a residue of previous processing can lead to attentional capture by corresponding stim-
uli in the environment. Here, we compared attentional capture by goal-driven and residual 
WM activation, and we examined how these effects are affected by dual-task interference. 
In two experiments, participants performed an animacy-judgment task for a word that they 
did or did not have to remember for a later recognition test. The word was followed in half 
the trials by an arithmetic task which served to disrupt WM-activation of the previously 
processed word. Subsequently, WM-driven capture was assessed by having participants per-
form a single-target RSVP task in which a line drawing corresponding to the word was pre-
sented shortly before a target. The results showed that the line drawing captured attention 
irrespective of the presence of the arithemetic task when the word had to be remembered. 
In comparison, the animacy judgment alone resulted in capture only when the arithmetic 
task was absent, and this effect was equally strong as the capture effect caused by a to-be-re-
membered word. Taken together, these findings show that while residual and goal-driven 
WM activation may be equally potent in guiding attentional selection, these two forms of 
WM activation differ in that residual activation is overwritten by an attention-demanding 
task, whereas goal-driven WM activation can lead to the reinstatement of a stimulus after 
performing such a task.
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Working memory (WM) enables the short-term maintenance and manipulation of 
goal-relevant information (Baddeley, 1992; Cowan, 2005). Since the capacity of WM is lim-
ited (e.g., Cowan, 2010; Luck & Vogel, 1997), there is a need for the prioritization of relevant 
over irrelevant information so as to ensure that only relevant information is represented 
in WM. This prioritization is assumed to be driven by a target template which is held in 
WM, and which biases attention to matching items in the visual field (Desimone & Duncan, 
1995). In support of this idea, many studies have shown that holding a stimulus in WM can 
lead to attentional capture by a matching stimulus even when this stimulus is irrelevant 
for a current task (Downing, 2000; Olivers, Peters, Houtkamp & Roelfsema, 2011; Soto, 
Hodoll, Rothstein, & Humphreys, 2007). For example, Soto and colleagues (Soto, Heinke, 
Humphreys, & Blanco, 2005; Soto, Humphreys, & Heinke, 2006) found that participants 
were slower to find a target in a search task if one of the distractors matched a colored shape 
that was held in memory for a later memory test. 
Interestingly, the occurrence of memory-driven capture does not appear to require the 
active maintenance of information in WM. Instead, it has been found that verbalizing (Soto 
& Humphreys, 2007), imagining (Pashler & Shiu, 1999), or judging the semantic properties 
of a stimulus (Sasin, Nieuwenstein, & Johnson, 2015) can also lead to capture by a matching 
stimulus that is subsequently presented as part of another task. Under these conditions, 
the processing of the stimulus appears to result in a residual form of WM activation which 
continues to influence the selection of new information until this activation has dissipated 
due to decay or interference. In support of this idea, Sasin and colleagues (2015) found that 
performing an animacy judgment for a word led to capture by a picture matching that word 
in a subsequent rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task, and they found that this effect 
did not occur when the animacy-judgment task and the subsequent RSVP task were sepa-
rated by the appearance of a display of to-be-remembered visual stimuli. This finding was 
interpreted as evidence that the activation of the word in WM was overwritten by the infor-
mation that had to be encoded for the visual WM task, thus preventing attentional capture 
by a matching picture in the subsequent RSVP task. 
The Current Study
In view of previous findings demonstrating that both goal-driven and residual WM 
activation can lead to memory-driven attentional capture, an interesting question regards if 
and how these two forms of WM activation differ in their ability to guide the selection of new 
information from the environment. To address this matter, we aimed to replicate our earlier 
findings that capture driven by residual WM activation from an animacy-judgment task can 
be prevented by means of an intervening task (Sasin et al., 2015), and we aimed to expand 
upon this work by investigating how the requirement to also remember the target for the an-
imacy task – thus turning residual activation into goal-driven WM activation – would affect 
attentional capture under conditions with and without an intervening task. 
In considering the potential differences between the capture effects driven by goal-driv-
en and residual WM, it is important to note that the likelihood of memory-driven capture 
has been argued to depend on the degree of activation of an item held in WM, such that 
items that are activated more strongly are more likely to result in attentional capture (Ol-
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ivers et al., 2011). By implication, the comparison of attentional capture caused by residu-
al and goal-driven WM activation can shed light on whether the instruction to remember 
will lead to stronger WM activation than that resulting from merely performing an anima-
cy-judgment task, in which case WM might be expected to be weaker due to temporal decay 
(e.g., Barrouillet, Bernardin, & Camos, 2004). 
While the comparison of attentional capture in the absence of dual-task interference 
may thus shed light on the temporal decay of residual WM activation, another interesting 
question is whether the presence of an intervening task would reduce attentional capture 
when the target for the animacy-judgment task has to be remembered. On the one hand, 
one could argue that the intervening task would be expected to interfere with WM activation 
for the target word, thereby reducing the likelihood of attentional capture in the subsequent 
RSVP task. At the same time, however, it could also be that the requirement to remember 
the word would lead to the reactivation of the word’s representation in WM after executing 
the intervening task, thus countering the interference produced by this task by reinstating 
the representation of the word in WM prior to the RSVP task (Oberauer, Lewandowsky, 
Farrell, Jarrold, & Greaves, 2011; see also Unsworth & Engle, 2006; 2007).
Method
Experiment 1a
Participants. Sixty-seven students (43 females; M = 20 years; SD = 2.24) of the En-
glish-language Psychology bachelor program at the University of Groningen participated 
in the experiment for partial course credit. All had normal or corrected-to-normal visual 
acuity. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology Department. 
Informed written consent was obtained. 
Apparatus and Stimuli. Stimulus presentation and response collection were con-
trolled by a program written with E-prime 2.0 (Schneider, Eschmann, & Zuccolotto, 2002) 
and the experiment was done on computers that were fitted with 22-inch CRT computer 
monitors with a refresh rate of 100 Hz and a resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels. 
The word stimuli used in the experiment were 64 high frequency English nouns of 
high imageability [479-655 (M = 593.88) according to the Paivio (1968) norms]. The En-
glish Lexicon Project (ELP) database was used to select words of high frequency accord-
ing to the Hyperspace Analogue to Language (HAL) frequency norms (Lund & Burgess, 
1996). We selected words that had a frequency of 20 per million or greater (Brysbaert & 
New, 2009) and that were found to be familiar to the participants in our previous study 
(Sasin et al., 2015). All words were displayed in Courier New, 25-point font. The picture 
stimuli were line drawings taken from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) and Interna-
tional Picture Naming Project (IPNP) sets (Szekely et al., 2005). Drawings of 178 nouns 
were used as stimuli in the experiment (64 were used as targets or were used as fillers in 
other trials and 114 were used as fillers), and each measured approximately 10.2 x 10.2 cm 
(7.29° of visual angle). The arithmetic problems were drawn from a pool of problems that 
included all possible multiplications of single digits from 2 to 9. Each arithmetic problem 
consisted of the presentation of a multiplication of two digits and an answer that was ei-
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ther correct or incorrect by a difference of 2 (e.g., 5  An additional set of 12 words and 40 
pictures were selected for a practice block. All stimuli were displayed in black on a white 
background at the center of the screen. 
Procedure. As shown in Figure 1, each trial began with a presentation of a word for 
which participants had to judge whether it referred to a living or a non-living thing as 
quickly as possible by pressing the “Z” or “M” key of the keyboard. After this animacy-judg-
ment task, an arithmetic problem was presented in half the trials. In this arithmetic-task 
present (AT- Present) condition, participants had to solve an arithmetic problem as quick-
ly as possible by indicating whether the presented answer for the problem was true or 
false, again using the “Z” and “M” keys. In the condition without the arithmetic task (i.e., 
the AT-Absent condition), a blank screen was presented in lieu of the arithmetic problem 
for a duration of 1500 ms. Following this blank interval, or following the response to the 
AT in the AT-Present condition, there was a 500-ms fixation period, after which an RSVP 
stream of thirteen pictures (each presented for 140 ms) was displayed. The participant’s 
task was to search for a target picture that was rotated 90° to the left or to the right. A 
picture corresponding to the target for the animacy-judgment task was always presented 
in position 4 of the RSVP sequence and this critical picture was followed at lag 2 or 7 by 
the target picture, meaning that the target could appear in the second or seventh RSVP 
position following the critical picture. After the sequence finished, participants responded 
by pressing the “Z” key for a target picture rotated to the left and the “M” key for a target 
picture rotated to the right. Participants were instructed to execute this task as accurately 
as possible, without time pressure. The experiment consisted of 64 trials and it was pre-
ceded by a 12- trials practice phase. The entire experiment lasted approximately 30 min.
Experiment 1b
Participants. Seventy-nine students (49 females; M = 20.1 years; SD = 1.57) of the 
English-language Psychology bachelor program at the University of Groningen participated 
in the experiment for partial course credit. All had normal or corrected-to-normal visual 
acuity. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology Department. 
Informed written consent was obtained. 
Apparatus and Stimuli. Apparatus and stimuli were identical to those of Experiment 
1a except that additional words were selected for a memory test. We selected 32 nouns of 
high imageability [479-655 (M= 593.88) according to the Paivio (1968) norms and high fre-
quency according to the Hyperspace Analogue to Language (HAL) frequency norms (Lund 
& Burgess, 1996). Half of the words denote living things and second half denote non-living 
things. An additional 6 words were selected for a practice phase. 
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Fig.1 Illustration of the trial sequence in experiment 1a and experiment 1b.
Procedure. The practice phase and experimental task were the same as in Experiment 
1, except that here participants were asked to remember the word that was used in the ani-
macy-judgment task for a later recognition test. This recognition test was done after partic-
ipants responded to the RSVP task, and it required participants to indicate whether a newly 
presented word was the same as the word they were asked to remember. The words used in 
the recognition test were selected at random from the set of available words and they always 
had the same animacy category as the word used in the animacy-judgment task. 
Data Analysis. We conducted conventional null-hypothesis significance tests, supple-
mented by Bayes factors analyses to ascertain evidence in favor of a null effect in case the 
significance test produced a non-significant effect. In computing Bayes factors, we used the 
JASP software package (Love et al., 2015) to compute the evidence for a null effect, with 
Bayes factors great than 1 signifying evidence in favor of the null. 
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First, we excluded 9 participants whose accuracy in the picture identification task was 
at chance-level, as established by a one-tailed binomial test. Exclusion of these participants 
did not change the pattern of results. Animacy judgments were correct on 97% of the trials, 
and the mean RT was 1308 ms. Performance in the arithmetic task was 94% correct, and 
the mean RT was 2257 ms. The analysis of performance in the RSVP task was restricted to 
trials that included correct responses in the animacy-judgment task and arithmetic task – if 
present. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with the factors AT-Present vs. AT-Absent, 
and lag (2 or 7) was performed on mean accuracy in the RSVP task. The ANOVA revealed no 
main effect of the presence of arithmetic task, F(1, 57) = 1.23, p = .272, Bayes Factor = 2.04, 
a significant effect of lag, F(1, 57) = 6.78, p = .012, η2 = 11, and a significant interaction of the 
presence of the arithmetic task and lag, F(1, 57) = 4.30, p = .043, η2 = .07. A follow-up pair-
wise t-test confirmed what can be seen in Figure 2, namely that accuracy was significantly 
worse at lag 2 (75.2%) than at lag 7 (81.9%), when the arithmetic task was absent t(57) = 
3.22, p = .002, d = 0.42, but not when the arithmetic task was present, (80% vs. 80.1%, t(57) 
= 0.042, p = .967, Bayes factor = 6.96). 
Fig.2 Results experiment 1a. Mean accuracy in the RsVP task is plotted as a function of presence of 
the arithmetic task and lag. the target picture appeared either at Lag 2 or Lag 7 after the critical picture 
which depicted the word that was previously processed for the animacy-judgment task. error bars reflect 
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Taken together, the results of Experiment 1a replicate our earlier findings (Sasin et al., 
2015) that an animacy-judgment task for a word results in attentional capture by a picture 
depicting this word in a subsequent RSVP task. As a result of this attentional capture effect, 
an attentional blink occurred for discrimination for the subsequent RSVP target. Further-
more, the results of Experiment 1 also replicated our earlier finding that the capture effect 
caused by residual WM activation is abolished by the requirement to perform an attention-
ally-demanding task after the word-judgment task, a finding signified by a Bayes factor of 
6.96 in favor of the hypothesis that there was no difference in performance between target 
discrimination performance at lag 2 and lag 7. What remains to be determined in Experi-
ment 1b is whether this attentional capture effect would be more pronounced and unaffect-
ed by the arithmetic task if participants were instructed to remember the target word for the 
animacy-judgment task. 
Fig.3 Results experiment 1b. Mean accuracy in the RsVP task is plotted as a function of the presence of 
the arithmetic task and the position of the target picture. the target picture appeared either at Lag 2 or Lag 
7 after the critical picture. error bars reflect standard errors of the mean. 
Experiment 1b
The results of 16 participants were excluded from the analysis because of chance-lev-
el performance in the picture identification task. Importantly, however, exclusion of these 
participants from the analysis did not change the pattern of results. The mean accuracy in 
the animacy-judgment task was 97% and the mean RT was 1402 ms. Performance in the 
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arithmetic task was 95% correct whereas performance in the memory task was 93% correct, 
with mean RTs of 2437 ms. and 1329 ms., respectively. We restricted the analysis of perfor-
mance in the RSVP task to trials with correct responses in the animacy-judgment task, the 
arithmetic task and the memory task. The results of this analysis showed no main effect of 
the presence of the arithmetic task, F(1, 62) = 0.12, p = .730, but there was a significant effect 
of lag, F(1, 62) = 9.71, p = .003, η2 = .14, with worse accuracy at Lag 2 (75.8%) than at Lag 7 
(80.1%). The effect of the arithmetic task did not interact with the lag, F(1, 62) = 0.003, p = 
.958, Bayes factor = 7.23, indicating that the requirement to remember the word led to atten-
tional capture regardless of the presence of the intermediate arithmetic task (see Figure 3). 
Results of comparison Experiment 1a and Experiment 1b. 
To determine whether the requirement to remember the word in Experiment 1b indeed 
led to a different pattern of results as those observed in Experiment 1a, we conducted an ad-
ditional analysis to compare the capture effects observed in these experiments. To this end, 
we first computed an attentional capture score by subtracting the accuracy score at Lag 2 
from the score at Lag 7, thus producing an estimate of the magnitude of the attentional blink 
produced by the critical picture. Then we carried out a mixed ANOVA using Experiment as 
a between-subjects factor and the presence of the arithmetic task as a within-subjects factor. 
Even though the results of Experiments 1a and 1b clearly showed a different effect of the 
presence of the arithmetic task within each experiment, the comparison of results between 
experiments showed that this difference did not result in a significant interaction between 
experiment and the effect of the arithmetic task, F(1, 119) = 1.95, p = .166, with a Bayes 
Factor of 0.58 signifying that the evidence was inconclusive with regard to the presence or 
absence of an interaction. Importantly, however, a planned comparison of the magnitude 
of the attentional capture effects without the arithmetic task did suggest that there was no 
difference in attentional capture under conditions in which the target for the animacy-judg-
ment task did or did not have to be remembered, t(119) = .83, p = .41, Bayes factor = 3.8, 
highlighting the fact that, in the absence of the arithmetic task, residual and goal-driven 
WM activation produced an equally strong capture effect in the RSVP task1. 
General Discussion
In the current study, we compared the extent to which goal-driven and residual WM 
activation result in attentional capture by a matching stimulus, and we examined how 
these effects are affected by dual-task interference. Replicating the results of our earlier 
study (Sasin et al., 2015), the results of Experiment 1a showed that an animacy-judgment 
task for a word results in attentional capture by a picture of that word when it is sub-
sequently shown as a distractor just before a target in RSVP, and they showed that this 
1  A comparable analysis of the capture effect in the condition with an arithmetic task showed that the difference between 
experiments was non-significant, t(119) = 1.3, p = .19, with a Bayes factor of 0.41. thus, even though the within-subjects 
comparisons of attentional capture for each experiment separately clearly showed a different pattern of results for each 
individual experiment, the between-experiments comparison was not sufficiently powerful to yield a statistically significant 
difference for the condition in which the arithmetic task was present.  
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effect does not occur when participants are asked to first perform an arithmetic task after 
the animacy-judgment task. In contrast, the results of Experiment 1b showed that when 
participants received the additional instruction to remember the target for the anima-
cy-judgment task, attentional capture occurred regardless of the presence of the arithme-
tic task. Lastly, the results of a between-experiments comparison showed that for a con-
dition without the intervening arithmetic task, the attentional capture effect was equally 
strong regardless of whether participants were instructed to remember the target for the 
animacy-judgment task. 
In considering the implications of the current findings, a first point of discussion lies 
in the mechanism by which performing an animacy-judgment task leads to attentional 
capture when there is no need to remember the target for this task, as demonstrated in 
Experiment 1a. One question that may arise in considering the nature of this mechanism 
is whether it should be explained in terms of capture driven by residual WM activation, or 
whether it may be better explained in terms of conceptual priming, that is, a facilitation 
of the processing of the critical picture in RSVP due to the previous processing of the cor-
responding word in the animacy-judgment task. There are several arguments against the 
latter priming account. To start, a key argument derives from the finding that the presence 
of an intervening arithmetic task prevented the occurrence of attentional capture in Ex-
periment 1a. This finding opposes a priming account because conceptual priming effects 
are known to persist across intervals of seconds, minutes, and sometimes even days filled 
with intervening tasks (Woltz & Was, 2007). Another argument against a priming account 
can be found in a study by Davenport and Potter (2005). In this study, a target word in 
RSVP could be primed by a related word shown before the RSVP sequence and the results 
showed that this semantic priming manipulation did not influence the extent to which the 
target in RSVP attracted attention. Lastly, Soto and colleagues (Soto et al., 2005) exam-
ined if the mere presentation of a visual shape leads that shape to subsequently capture 
attention a visual search task. The results showed that this form of repetition priming did 
not lead to attentional capture. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the capture effect 
elicited by a previously processed word in Experiment 1a is unlikely to be due to priming, 
as such a priming effect would not be expected to result in attentional capture and it would 
also not be expected to be abolished by an intervening task.  
In demonstrating that performing an animacy-judgment task leads to a comparable 
attentional capture effect regardless of whether the target for this task needs to be remem-
bered, the current findings resonate well with those reported Soto and Humphreys (2007) 
who also found comparable attentional capture effects when a visual stimulus had to be 
verbalized or encoded into memory. Given that the likelihood of attentional capture is as-
sumed to depend on the level of WM activation achieved by an item (Olivers et al., 2011), 
this set of findings suggests that the level of WM activation that results from an anima-
cy-judgment or verbalization task is comparable to the level of activation that results from 
asking participants to remember a stimulus. An important conclusion that can be derived 
from these findings is that information that is activated in WM in the process of executing 
a certain task is not rapidly lost due to temporal decay if there is no goal to maintain that 
information for a later memory test, as such a rapid decay of activation should result in 
weaker attentional capture effect for residual as compared to goal-driven WM activation. 
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By implication, the current findings also suggest that it may be unnecessary to include a 
memory task to study memory-driven attentional capture, as the residual activation that 
results from processing a stimulus appears to suffice to elicit this effect. 
While residual WM activation may thus be equally potent as goal-driven WM activa-
tion in guiding the focus of attention towards matching stimuli in the environment, it does 
appear to be the case that goal-driven activation is different in that it allows for capture to 
occur even after performing an unrelated, attention-demanding task. In this regard, the 
current findings differ from previous studies in which the inclusion of an additional task – 
the requirement to perform articulatory suppression throughout the trial sequence – was 
found to result in a lack of attentional capture (Soto & Humphreys, 2008; Woodman & 
Luck, 2007). In explaining why the current manipulation of including an arithmetic task 
did not similarly reduce the likelihood of attentional capture, an important consideration 
lies in the fact that while articulatory suppression imposes an increased demand on pro-
cessing resources throughout the trial sequence, the current study involved an intermit-
tent increase in load because the arithmetic task was inserted between the encoding of 
the to-be-remembered item and the subsequent RSVP task. By implication, the current 
finding that the presence of the arithmetic task did not attenuate attentional capture in 
the subsequent RSVP task may be explained by assuming that while the arithmetic task 
temporarily displaced the to-be-remembered word from the focus of attention in WM, the 
instruction to remember the word not only allowed it to be retained in WM during the 
execution of the arithmetic task, but it also allowed for the memory trace to be refreshed 
after executing the arithmetic task. This account converges with theories of performance 
in the operation-span task which assume that the execution of an arithmetic task causes 
the momentary displacement of a to-be-remembered item from the focus of attention to 
a secondary form of WM from where it is subsequently retrieved automatically so as to be 
reinstated in WM after processing of the arithmetic task (Oberauer et al., 2011; see also, 
McCabe, 2008; Unsworth & Engle, 2007). 
Taken together, the current findings add to a growing body of research that illus-
trates how memory can influence the perception of newly encountered information by 
guiding the focus of attention towards information that matches the information ac-
tivated in mind (Olivers et al., 2011; Soto et al., 2007). What this work has shown is 
that when there is no need to maintain a search template actively in WM because it 
remains unchanged across trials, as in the current experiments, the activation of infor-
mation in WM appears to be capable of such guidance even when this is detrimental to 
performing the task at hand, and even when the match between the contents of WM 
and the incoming sensory input derives from a conceptual match. In contrast, when the 
search template changes from trial to trial, it appears as though that template needs to 
be activated more strongly (Olivers, 2009), thus preventing attentional capture for other 
items that are concurrently represented in WM (Downing & Dodds, 2004; Houtkamp 
& Roelfsema, 2006). Importantly, however, the degree of WM activation for a particu-
lar item may vary dynamically over time (see also, Green, Kennedy, & Soto, 2015), thus 
modulating the likelihood of attentional capture, as also indicated by the current finding 
that attentional capture varied with the waxing and waning of WM activation caused by 
momentary distraction.  
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Forget me if you can: 
attentional capture 
by to-be-remembered 
and to-be-forgotten visual stimuli

Abstract
Previous studies on directed forgetting in visual working memory (VWM) have shown that 
if people are cued to remember only a subset of the items currently held in VWM, they 
will completely forget the uncued, no-longer relevant items. While this finding is indicative 
of selective remembering, it remains unclear whether directed forgetting can also occur in 
the absence of any concurrent to-be-remembered information. In the current study, we ad-
dressed this matter by asking participants to memorize a single object that could be followed 
by a cue to forget or remember this object. Following the cue, we assessed the object’s acti-
vation in VWM by determining whether a matching distractor would capture attention in a 
visual search task. The results showed that, compared to a cue to remember, a cue to forget 
led to a reduced likelihood of attentional capture by a matching distractor. In addition, we 
found that capture effects by to-be-remembered and to-be-forgotten distractors remained 
stable as the interval between the onset of the cue and the search task increased from 700 
ms to 3900 ms. We conclude that, in the absence of any to-be-remembered objects, an in-
struction to forget an object held in WM leads to a rapid but incomplete deactivation of the 
representation of that object, thus allowing it to continue to produce a weak biasing effect on 
attentional selection for several seconds after the instruction to forget. 
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“Forgetting is as important a function as remembering.” (p. 148; James, 1892).
As alluded to by William James, there are benefits to forgetting. In the domain of work-
ing memory, the mind’s system for temporary maintenance and manipulation of informa-
tion (Baddeley, 2010; Carlisle, Arita, Pardo, & Woodman, 2011; Cowan, 2008; Oberauer, 
2009), forgetting is important because WM is known to be limited in its capacity for re-
taining information (Cowan, 2010; Luck & Vogel, 1997) and because it is known that in-
formation activated in WM biases the selection of new perceptual input towards matching 
stimuli (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Downing, 2000; Greene, Kennedy, & Soto, 2015; Ol-
ivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006; Pan, 2010; Sasin, Nieuwenstein, & Johnson, 2015; Sasin 
& Nieuwenstein, 2016; Soto, Heinke, Humphreys, & Blanco, 2005). Thus, the forgetting of 
no-longer relevant information is of importance to protect WM from being overloaded and 
to prevent no-longer relevant information from guiding attentional selection and behavior 
(Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Oberauer, 2014; Ecker, Oberauer, & Lewandowsky, 2014). 
In previous studies, directed or intentional forgetting of information in WM has been 
investigated using the retro-cuing paradigm (Gunseli, Van Moorselaar, Meeter, & Oliv-
ers, 2015; Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006; Pertzov, Bays, Joseph, & Husain, 2013; Van 
Moorselaar, Battisoni, Theeuwes, & Olivers, 2015; Van Moorselaar, Olivers, Theeuwes, 
Lamme, & Sligte, 2015; Williams, Hong, Kang, Carlisle, & Woodman, 2013; Williams & 
Woodman, 2012). In this paradigm, participants are first presented an array of items that 
have to be encoded into WM and they are then presented a cue that indicates which subset 
of these items needs to be prioritized and remembered for a later memory test. Subsequent-
ly, on some trials, memory for the uncued items is unexpectedly assessed either by asking 
participants to reproduce an uncued item, or by examining whether a distractor that match-
es one of the uncued items captures attention in a visual search task, a phenomenon known 
as memory-driven attentional capture (Downing, 2000; Greene, Kennedy, & Soto, 2015; 
Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006; Pan, 2010; Sasin, Nieuwenstein, & Johnson, 2015; Soto, 
Heinke, Humphreys, & Blanco, 2005). Taken together, the results of these studies show that 
retro cues are effective in enhancing memory for the cued items, and they make clear that 
this enhancement goes at the expense of memory for the uncued items as many of these 
studies found that the uncued items are completely forgotten. Specifically, studies employ-
ing the implicit measure of memory-driven attentional capture show no evidence of capture 
by distractors matching an uncued item (Olivers et al., 2006; Van Moorselaar, Battisoni, et 
al., 2015; Van Moorselaar, Olivers, et al., 2015b) whereas studies using explicit measures 
show that participants can only guess in trying to reproduce the color of an uncued item 
(Williams et al., 2013). In accounting for these effects, it has been proposed that a retro-cue 
leads to attentional prioritization and selective maintenance of the cued items. That is, in 
more general terms, the cue is assumed to cause of shift or redistribution of limited working 
memory resources to only the cued items (see also, Bays & Husain, 2008), thus causing the 
uncued items to decay in the absence of resources to support their retention in WM. 
The Current Study
While studies using the retro-cuing paradigm provide compelling evidence that peo-
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ple are capable of selectively remembering a cued subset of items held in VWM, they leave 
unresolved whether people are able to intentionally forget no-longer relevant items held in 
VWM. That is, the fact that people can selectively remember a cued subset of items does not 
entail intentional forgetting of the uncued items, as the forgetting of uncued items could 
be explained as an unintentional consequence of the attentional prioritization of the cued 
items. In the current study, we set out to provide a more direct test of intentional forgetting 
by examining how a cue to forget an earlier memorized object influences attentional capture 
by a matching distractor when there is no competing information to be retained in VWM. 
Specifically, we asked participants to memorize a single colored shape which was followed 
by a cue that indicated whether this object had to be retained in VWM for a later recognition 
test, or whether it could be forgotten. To ensure that participants would adhere to the in-
struction provided by the retro-cue, the cue was 100% valid (Gunseli et al., 2015, Williams & 
Woodman, 2012), meaning that we never unexpectedly probed participants for their mem-
ory of the uncued item in a surprise recognition test. To determine whether a cue to forget 
would indeed lead to intentional forgetting, we used an implicit measure of VWM activation 
by examining whether a distractor that matched the to-be-remembered or to-be-forgotten 
object would capture attention in an unrelated visual search task that was performed at dif-
ferent intervals following the cue. By varying the duration of the interval separating the cue 
and the visual search task, we aimed to assess the time course of any cue-induced forgetting.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Eighteen students of the University of Groningen (11 females; M = 20.3 
years; SD = 1.45) participated in the experiment for partial course credit. All participants 
had normal or corrected to normal visual acuity. The study was approved by the Ethics Com-
mittee of the Psychology Department. Informed written consent was obtained.
Apparatus and Stimuli. Stimulus presentation and response collection were con-
trolled by a program written with E-prime 2.0 (Schneider, Eschmann, & Zuccolotto, 2002) 
and the experiment was conducted on computers that were fitted with 22-inch CRT com-
puter monitors with a refresh rate of 100 Hz and a resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels. 
All stimuli were presented on a gray background. The shapes used were a circle (1.8°  1.8° 
of visual angle), a diamond (1.8° x  1.8°), a square (1.9° x 1.9°), a triangle (2° x 1.7°),  and a hexa-
gon (2° x 1.7°). The color of the shapes could be red (R = 255, G= 0, B = 0), green (R = 0, G= 
255, B = 0), blue (R = 0, G= 0, B = 255), yellow (R = 255, G= 255, B = 0) or pink (R = 255, G= 
192, B = 203). The thickness of the border line of the shapes was 0.12° in visual angle. One col-
ored shape was displayed as a memory object at the center of the screen. Four colored shapes 
were displayed for the search task and each shape contained a black line (0.57° length  0.12°). 
The three distractor lines were vertical and the target line was tilted 38° either to the left or to 
the right. The shapes were positioned at the corner of an imaginary rectangle measuring 5.7° 
of visual angle horizontally and 4.1° vertically. Each object in the search display was unique in 
color and shape. The cue to forget or remember was displayed in the form of the correspond-
ing word being shown in black Courier New, 20-point font, at the center of the screen. 
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Procedure. Figure 1 illustrates different types of trials used in Experiment 1. At the be-
ginning of each trial, there was 500-ms fixation period, after which the memory object was 
presented for a duration of 1000 ms. Participants were asked to remember both the color 
and the shape of the memory object. Next, there was a 500-ms blank interval followed by 
the cue which indicated whether the memory object had to be maintained in memory for a 
later memory test or whether it could be forgotten. The cue was displayed for 500 ms. After 
an inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) of 200, 600, 1000 or 1400 ms the search display appeared. 
The participant’s task for the search display was to discriminate the orientation of the target 
line by pressing the “Z” key when it was tilted to the left and by pressing the “M” key when it 
was tilted to the right. There were two different types of trials. On invalid trials, one of the 
objects in the search display matched both the color and the shape of the memory object. 
This matching object always contained a distractor line and always was presented on the op-
posite side to the target. On neutral trials, neither of the features of the memory object was 
shared by any of the objects in the search display. The search display remained on the screen 
until the response was made. The response was followed by 500-ms blank interval. In the 
remember condition, the memory test followed the offset of this blank interval. For this test, 
a colored shape appeared in the center of the screen and participants were instructed to in-
dicate whether this memory probe was identical (in shape and color) to the memory object. 
On different trials, the memory probe and the memory object differed in color, shape or both 
features and the participants had to respond by pressing the “M” key of the keyboard. When 
the memory probe was the same as the memorized object, participants had to press the “Z” 
key. Participants were instructed to execute the memory task as accurately as possible, with-
out time pressure. The search task had to be completed as quickly and accurately as possible. 
The manipulations of cue (remember or forget), distractor match (invalid or neutral) 
and ISI (200, 600, 1000 or 1400 ms) resulted in a total of sixteen conditions which were 
presented in a random order. There were 32 trials for each condition, resulting in a total of 
512 trials which were presented in blocks of 64 trials each. The experiment was preceded by 
32 trials to practice the tasks and the experiment took about 55 minutes in total. 
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Fig.1 Illustration of the task used in experiment 1 and experiment 2. Presentation of memory object was 
followed by the word cue (forget or remember). After variable IsI (200 ms, 600 ms, 1000 or 1400 ms in 
experiment 1 and 200 ms, 600 ms, 2000 or 3400 ms in experiment 2, participants performed the search 
task. the memory task was present only on trials with the cue remember. 
Results
Performance was near ceiling in the search and memory tasks (M = 98% and M = 94% 
correct, respectively). Before analyzing the RTs for the search task, we first excluded those 
trials from the remember condition in which the response to the memory task was incorrect. 
In addition, we excluded all trials in which the response to the search task was incorrect, 
and we also excluded trials in which the search-RT appeared to be an outlier. Specifically, we 
first excluded trials with search-RTs shorter than 150 ms or longer than 3000 ms, and we 
subsequently identified and excluded any remaining outliers using the procedure described 
by Van Selst and Jolicoeur (1994). Together, these procedures resulted in a loss of 2.4% of 
data points. The exclusion of trials did not change the pattern of results.
To examine performance on the search task, we conducted a 2 (cue: remember or for-
get) x 2 (match: invalid or neutral) x 4 (ISI: 200, 600, 1000 or 1400 ms) repeated measures 
ANOVA on the mean RTs for correct responses. The results, illustrated in Figure 2, revealed 
a main effect of cue, F(1, 17) = 22.33, p < .001,h2p= .57, match, F(1, 17) = 27.01, p < .001, h
2
p 
= .61, and ISI, F(3, 51) = 7.24, p = .003, h2p= .30. In addition, there were significant interac-
tions of cue and ISI, F(3, 51) = 2.91, p = .049, h2p = .15, and of cue and match, F(1, 17) = 10.87, 
p = .004, h2p= .39. The two-way interaction between match and with ISI was non-signifi-
cant, F(3, 51) = 1.09, p = .355, h2p= .06, and the three-way interaction between match, cue 
and ISI was also not significant, F(3, 51) = 1.16, p = .325, h2p = .06.  
In a subsequent series of analyses, we further examined the two-way interactions be-
tween cue and ISI, and between cue and match. In examining the interaction between cue 
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These analyses showed that there was a significant effect of ISI in the remember condition 
F(3, 51) = 7.24, p = .001, h2p= .30, but not in the forget condition, F(3, 51) = 1.30, p = .284, 
h2p = .07. For the remember condition, a series of post-hoc comparisons using Holm-Bonfer-
roni correction revealed that RTs were significantly slower at the ISI of 200 ms than at all 
longer ISIs (all t’s > 2.11, all p’s < .047), with no significant differences in RT for ISIs of 600 
ms and longer (all t’s < 1.89, all p’s > .485). A similar follow-up analysis for the interaction 
between cue and match showed that invalid trials resulted in slower RTs relative to neutral 
trials for both the remember condition, M = 826 vs. M = 774 ms, respectively, t(17) = 6.01, p 
< .001, and the forget condition, 758 ms vs 741 ms, respectively, t(17) = 2.94, p = .009, with 
the magnitude of the capture effect being significantly larger in the former (52 ms) than in 
the latter condition (16 ms), t(17) = 4.10, p = .001. 
Fig.2 Results of experiment 1. Mean Rts (ms) in the search task as a function of cue condition, match 
condition and the IsI (A). Mean Rts (ms) in the search task as a function of cue condition and IsI (B). 
Mean Rts (ms) in the search task as a function of cue condition and match condition (c). error bars reflect 
within-subject standard errors of the mean (Morey, 2008).








































































Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 show that a distractor matching an earlier 
memorized object captured attention regardless of whether it had to be remembered or forgot-
ten, but the capture effect was smaller when the object had to be forgotten. Furthermore, the re-
sults of Experiment 1 showed that the likelihood of attentional capture by a distractor matching 
the to-be-forgotten object remained constant across ISIs of 200 to 1400 ms, thus suggesting that 
there was no decay of the to-be-forgotten object across this time period. To test if any such decay 
would occur with longer intervals, Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 with the exception that 
the ISI between the cue and search task was 200, 600, 2000 or 3400 ms. 
Method
Participants. Eighteen of the University of Groningen (12 females; M = 20.6 years; SD 
= 2.19) participated in the experiment for partial course credit. None of the participants had 
taken part in Experiment 1 and all participants had normal or corrected to normal visual 
acuity. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology Department. 
Informed written consent was obtained.
Apparatus and Stimuli. The stimuli and apparatus were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1. 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except that the ISI between 
the word cue and the search task was 200, 600, 2000 or 3400 ms.
Results
Participants achieved 92% correct on the memory task and 97% correct on the search 
task. In analyzing the results from the search task, we followed the same procedures as those 
described for Experiment 1, resulting in a loss of 2.5% of the data points. The exclusion of 
trials did not change the pattern of results.
Performance on the search task was analyzed in the same way as in Experiment 1. The 
results, illustrated in Figure 3 showed significant main effects of cue, F(1, 17) = 27.60, p < 
.001, h2p = .62, match, F(1, 17) = 26.94, p < .001, h
2
p= .61, and ISI, F(3, 51) = 6.83, p = .002, 
h2p= .29. In addition, the results revealed significant interactions between cue and ISI, F(3, 
51) = 7.72, p = .002, h2p = .31, and between cue and match, F(1, 17) = 11.90, p = .004,  h
2
p = 
.41. There was no interaction between match and ISI, F(3, 51) = 2.67, p = .071, h2p= .14, nor 
between match, cue, and ISI, F(3, 51) = 2.57, p = .084,  h2p= 13. 
In a follow-up analysis, we further examined the Cue × ISI interaction by testing the ef-
fect of ISI for the remember and forget conditions separately. The effect of ISI was significant 
in the remember condition, F(3, 51) = 13.71, p < .001,  h2p = .45, but not in the forget condition, 
F(3, 51) = 0.87, p = .464,  h2p= .05. For the remember condition, post-hoc comparisons with 
Holm-Bonferroni correction revealed that RTs were significantly slower at the ISI of 200 ms 
than at all longer ISIs, all t’s >  2.11, all p’s < .047, with no significant differences in RT across 
ISIs of 600-3400 ms, all t’s < 0.95, all p’s > .542. To further examine the Cue × Match inter-
action (see Figure 7), we conducted paired-samples t-tests. For the remember condition, RTs 
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were slower in the invalid (761 ms) than in the neutral (711 ms) condition, t(17) = 5.98, p < 
.001, and the same was true for the forget condition (707 ms vs 688 ms, respectively; t(17) = 
2.36, p = .030). The difference in RT on invalid and neutral trials was significantly smaller in 
the forget condition (19 ms) than in the remember condition (50 ms), t(17) = 3.35, p = .004. 
Fig.2 Results of experiment 2. Mean Rts (ms) in the search task as a function of cue condition, match 
condition and the IsI (A). Mean Rts (ms) in the search task as a function of cue condition and IsI (B). 
Mean Rts (ms) in the search task as a function of cue condition and match condition (c). error bars reflect 
within-subject standard errors of the mean (Morey, 2008).
General Discussion 
Previous studies on directed forgetting in VWM have shown that if participants are 
cued to remember a subset of items currently held in VWM, their memory for the cued 
subset will be enhanced at the expense of forgetting the uncued items (Olivers et al., 2006; 






































































Van Moorselaar et al., 2015a; Van Moorselaar et al., 2015b; Williams et al., 2013; Williams 
& Woodman, 2012). While this finding makes clear that people can selectively remember a 
cued subset of information held in VWM, it leaves unresolved whether people can also in-
tentionally forget no-longer relevant information in the absence of any concurrent to-be-re-
membered information. To address this matter, we asked participants to memorize a single 
object which was followed by a cue to either remember or forget this object, and we ex-
amined the effects of this instruction to remember or forget by determining the likelihood 
that a distractor matching the earlier memorized object would capture attention in a visual 
search task that was presented at different intervals following the cue. The results of two 
such experiments converged in showing that an instruction to forget leads to deactivation 
of the memory trace of the earlier memorized object, such that attentional capture was still 
present but less pronounced following an instruction to forget, as opposed to remember, the 
earlier memorized object. Furthermore, the results showed that capture was unaffected by 
the duration of the interval between the cue and the search task, and they showed that an 
instruction to remember led to slower visual search when the search task followed closely 
in time to the instruction to remember whereas no such slowing of search was observed 
following a cue to forget.
In demonstrating that, in the absence of any to-be-remembered items, a cue to for-
get an earlier memorized object leads to a reduced likelihood of memory-driven attentional 
capture, the current findings move beyond the results of previous studies which showed evi-
dence of complete forgetting of to-be-forgotten objects in the presence of to-be-remembered 
objects (Olivers et al., 2006; Van Moorselaar et al., 2015a; Van Moorselaar et al., 2015b; Wil-
liams et al., 2013; Williams & Woodman, 2012). Specifically, while the forgetting of uncued 
materials in previous studies can be explained as a side effect of the attentional prioritization 
and selective maintenance of to-be-remembered items, the current finding that an instruc-
tion to forget an earlier memorized object led to a reduced likelihood of attentional capture 
by a matching distractor can only be explained in terms of intentional forgetting. 
In accounting for why intentional forgetting did not fully prevent the occurrence of 
memory-driven attentional capture, we can conceive of three possible explanations: Partici-
pants might have occasionally failed to adhere to the instruction to forget, the to-be-forgot-
ten object might have guided attention based on a long-term memory (LTM) representation, 
or forgetting might have led to an incomplete deactivation of the WM trace, thus allowing 
for a weak, residual guidance effect. In considering these three possibilities in closer detail, 
it becomes clear that incomplete deactivation appears to provide the least contentious ex-
planation. Specifically, the notion that participants sometimes failed to adhere to the cue 
to forget seems incompatible with a post-hoc analysis of the variance of RTs in the forget 
condition. In this analysis, we compared the standard deviations of RTs in the invalid and 
neutral trials of the forget condition, the idea being that variance should be larger on invalid 
trials than neutral trials if the invalid trials indeed included some trials in which capture oc-
curred because of unsuccessful forgetting. The results of this comparison, however, revealed 
no difference in the standard deviations of RTs1, thus providing no evidence for the possi-
bility that the residual attentional capture effect seen in the forget condition stemmed from 
1 specifically, we found that the average sD of Rts was equal for neutral and invalid trials in the forget condition, M = 173 
Vs. M = 183, t(35) = 1.80, p = .081.
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an occasional failure to forget the earlier memorized object. With regard to the possibility 
that this residual capture effect was driven by a long-term memory representation, we note 
that while the repeated exposure and memorization of stimuli might indeed have led to an 
LTM representation which could potentially guide visual attention (Rosen, Stern, Michalka, 
Devaney, & Somers, 2015; Woodman, Carlisle, & Reinhart, 2013), this seems an unlikely 
account of the residual capture effect because any such LTM-guidance would be expected 
to occur for all distractors in the search task, thus precluding an LTM-driven capture effect 
as an explanation for the capture effect found only in invalid trials in the forget condition. 
By implication, it seems that the residual capture effect found in the forget condition is best 
explained in term of an intentional but incomplete deactivation of the representation of the 
to-be-forgotten object. In this regard, the current findings can be said to corroborate the 
results of studies of intentional forgetting of verbal information, which have also provided 
evidence that people can choose to forget verbal information from WM by demonstrating 
that increasing the number of forget cues leads to more complete forgetting (Anderson & 
Greene, 2001; see also, Lee, Lee, & Tsai, 2007). Indeed, in light of these earlier findings, it 
can be argued that the current finding that memory-driven attentional capture still occurred 
several seconds after a cue to forget may be due to the fact that our use of a single cue to 
forget was insufficient to cause complete forgetting of the earlier memorized object. 
In considering the mechanism underlying the current finding of directed forgetting, it 
is of relevance to note that while the capture effect by distractors matching the to-be-for-
gotten object remained stable as the interval between the cue and the search task increased 
from 200 to 3400 ms, we also did not find evidence for a cost of processing the cue to forget, 
such that reaction times on the search task were found to be stable as the interval between 
the cue and the search task increased from 200 to 3400 ms. In other words, the current 
findings show that the processing of the cue to forget did not incur a cost to performance on 
the search task, and they show that the residual activation of the to-be-forgotten object did 
not dissipate across increasing delays. In considering the implications of these findings, it 
is important to bear in mind that the cue itself was presented for 500 ms, meaning that the 
shortest interval between the onset of the cue and the onset of the search task was 700 ms. 
Thus, it appears to be the case that the partial forgetting that was triggered by the cue took 
effect during this 700 ms interval, such that no further forgetting occurred across longer in-
tervals. In this regard, the current findings can be said to argue against decay-based theories 
of forgetting (e.g., Barrouillet, Bernardin, & Camos, 2004) whereas they offer support for 
interference-based theories of forgetting (e.g., Oberauer, Lewandowsky, Farrell, Jarrold, & 
Greaves, 2012), as the former would predict that forgetting should increase with additional 
time, whereas the latter would not predict such an effect if that period of time is not used for 
processing other information, as was the case in the current study.
In the current study, we found that an instruction to forget the earlier encoded object 
led to overall faster performance in a subsequent, unrelated search task that was performed 
at different intervals after the presentation of the cue to forget the object. This finding differs 
from the finding reported by Fawcett and Taylor (Fawcett & Taylor, 2008; 2010), who found 
that an instruction to forget an earlier encoded word resulted in slower responses for a sub-
sequent unrelated task when the interval separating the cue and this unrelated task was less 
than 1800 ms. In accounting for the discrepancy between the current finding and this find-
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ing by Fawcett and Taylor, it is important to note that there are a number of methodological 
differences that might explain this discrepancy. Specifically, the study by Fawcett and Taylor 
presented participants with a study word on each trial, followed by an instruction to re-
member or forget. Subsequently, participants performed unrelated detection task. After all 
study words were presented, participants performed a recognition test examining memory 
for the to-be-remembered words and, unexpectedly, for the to-be-forgotten words as well. In 
contrast, we asked participants to memorize a simple colored shape on each trial, which was 
followed by an instruction to remember or forget which in turn was followed by the unrelat-
ed search task.  After the search task, a memory test was presented only on trials in which 
participants were cued to remember the object. In considering which of these methodolog-
ical differences might explain the discrepancy in results, one could argue that perhaps the 
use of verbal materials and the requirement to forget in the presence of to-be-remembered 
words might have led to different results in the study by Fawcett and Taylor. Specifically, it 
could be that participants in the study by Fawcett and Taylor required more time to process 
the instruction to forget due to the difficulty of forgetting a word, as opposed to forgetting 
one of a small set of possible colored shapes, and due to the extra time and effort it might 
take to forget in the presence of to-be-remembered items. Indeed, it is worth noting that 
Ecker and colleagues (Ecker, Lewandowsky et al., 2014; Ecker, Oberauer et al., 2014) found 
that it takes less time to remove three items from WM than it takes to remove only one or 
two of these items, thus lending credence to the possibility that the discrepancy between the 
current study and the findings by Fawcett and Taylor could be due to the additional time it 
takes to forget in the presence of to-be-remembered items.
To conclude, the current study shows that memory-driven capture offers a highly use-
ful paradigm to study intentional forgetting of information held in VWM. Supplementing 
previous findings, the current findings show that participants can choose to forget a single 
object held in VWM even when there are no concurrent processing demands. In addition, 
they show that such forgetting need not result in a complete deactivation of the object’s 
representation in WM, and they suggest that the process by which forgetting occurs can 
be accomplished rapidly, within 700 ms after the appearance of an instruction to forget an 
earlier memorized object. 
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in visual working memory

Abstract
Previous studies have shown that attentional selection of a subset of items held in working 
memory (WM) leads to complete forgetting of the no longer relevant items. Here, we in-
vestigated whether such selective remembering can also occur for individual features of an 
object. Participants were instructed, via a cue, to remember either the color or shape of a 
colored shape and this cue was presented after (Experiment 1) or before (Experiment 2) the 
colored shape. Subsequently, participants searched for a tilted line among vertical distractor 
lines, each embedded within a colored shape. On some trials, one of the distractors in the 
search task could match the relevant or irrelevant feature of the previously shown object. 
The results of Experiment 1 showed that color attracted attention regardless of its relevance. 
On the contrary, the results of Experiment 2 showed that color guided visual attention only 
when it was pre-cued as the relevant feature. Additionally, the results of both experiments 
showed no evidence for capture by shape, even though performance on a memory test for 
shape was highly accurate. Furthermore, the capture effect for color did not depend on the 
inter-stimulus interval separating the retro-cue (in Experiment 1) or memory object (in Ex-
periment 2) from the ensuing search task. Taken together, these findings suggest that a pre-
cue allows participants to encode only the shape of an object while a retro-cue does not allow 
for the selective retention of only the shape of the object. Accordingly, we conclude that 
selection of a single feature of an object in memory is possible during perception, whereas it 
is not possible to select a single feature of an object once it is retained in WM.
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How task-relevant information is selected and encoded in working memory (WM) is 
one of the most important questions in WM research. Such selection of task-relevant infor-
mation is critical because the limited capacity of WM allows for only a few representations to 
be retained at the same time (Cowan, 2010; Luck & Vogel, 1997). Moreover, in most cogni-
tive tasks, the relevance of processed information changes dynamically based on the behav-
ioral goals. Thus, the contents of WM must be updated constantly so that the information 
most relevant for achieving current goals is selected and retained while information that is 
no longer relevant is forgotten (Oberauer, Lewandowsky, Farrell, Jarrold, & Greaves, 2012). 
In examining the mechanisms that control the contents of WM, considerable insight 
has been gained by studies using the retro-cueing paradigm. In this paradigm, participants 
are first asked to encode one or more stimuli in WM, after which they are presented with a 
cue that indicates which of these stimuli is task-relevant (for a recent review, see Souza & 
Oberauer, 2016). In analogy to studies investigating the effects of selective attention on an 
encoding of sensory stimuli, studies using the retro-cuing paradigm have shown that mech-
anisms of attentional selection can also operate on stimuli represented in WM. Specifically, 
there have been several studies that show that participants can select a subset of the memo-
rized stimuli, thus allowing these stimuli to be retained while the uncued, unattended stim-
uli are rapidly extinguished from WM (Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006; van Moorselaar, 
Battistoni, Theeuwes, & Olivers, 2015; Williams, Hong, Kang, Carlisle, & Woodman, 2013; 
see also, Sasin, Morey & Nieuwenstein, 2017). Interestingly, such selection in WM appears 
to rely on similar mechanisms as those involved in attentional selection of sensory input, as 
it has also been shown that the selection of a task-relevant stimulus in a memorized search 
array is associated with event-related potentials similar to those seen during search amongst 
physically present stimuli (Dell’Acqua, Sessa, Toffanin, Luria, & Jolicœur, 2010; Eimer & 
Kiss, 2010). Taken together, these findings suggest that people can control the contents of 
WM using mechanisms of selective attention that appear to operate similarly to those that 
mediate attentional selection during perceptual encoding (Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2011; 
Kuo, Rao, Lepsien, & Nobre, 2009; Nobre et al., 2004). 
While previous studies thus provide evidence that participants can use mechanisms 
of location-based and feature-based attention to selectively attend and remember a subset 
of stimuli represented in WM, it remains unclear whether participants would also be able 
to selectively attend and retain only one feature of a stimulus held in WM. In recent work, 
such selective perceptual processing of object features has been observed in a study by Oli-
vers, Meijer, and Theeuwes (2006). In this study, participants were shown a colored shape 
and they were instructed to encode either the shape or the color of this object in memory 
for a later recognition task. Subsequently, participants first performed a visual search task 
in which one of the distractors could match either the shape or the color of the previous-
ly shown object. The results showed that this distractor only captured attention when it 
matched the to-be-remembered feature of the earlier object, and not when it matched the 
to-be-ignored feature, thus indicating that participants were able to selectively encode just 
the task-relevant feature of the object. In the current study, we examined whether this effect 
would also occur when the object in question has already been encoded in WM, thus requir-
ing the selective retention of only one of two features of an object held in WM. To address 
this matter, we used a memory-driven attentional capture paradigm similar to that used by 
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Olivers et al. (Downing, 2000; Pan, 2010; Soto, Hodsoll, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2008; 
Soto, Humphreys, & Heinke, 2006) to examine whether a distractor matching either the 
shape or the color of an earlier memorized object would capture attention after participants 
had been presented a retro-cue which indicated that they only had to remember the shape 
or color of the object. 
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Twenty-four students enrolled in the English language Psychology 
bachelor program at the University of Groningen participated in the experiment for partial 
course credit.  All participants had normal or corrected to normal visual acuity (9 females; M 
= 21 years ; SD = 2.37). The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology 
Department. Informed written consent was obtained.
Apparatus and Stimuli. The experiment was conducted on computers that were fitted 
with 22-inch CRT computer monitors with a refresh rate of 100 Hz and a resolution of 1024 
x 768 pixels. We presented stimuli using a program written with E-prime 2.0 (Schneider, 
Eschmann, & Zuccolotto, 2002). 
The stimuli were a circle (1.8° × 1.8° of visual angle), a diamond (1.8° × 1.8°), a square 
(1.9° × 1.9°), a triangle (2° × 1.7°), and a hexagon (2° × 1.7°). These shapes were drawn as 
outlines, with a red (R = 255, G= 0, B = 0), green (R = 0, G= 255, B = 0), blue (R = 0, G= 0, 
B = 255), yellow (R = 255, G= 255, B = 0) or pink (R = 255, G= 192, B = 203) outline of 0.12° 
width in visual angle. One colored shape constituted the memory object and was presented 
at the center of the screen at the start of the trial. 
The display for the search task consisted of four unique colored shapes that were posi-
tioned at the corners of an imaginary rectangle measuring 5.7° of visual angle horizontally 
and 4.1° vertically. At the center, a central fixation cross was drawn. At the center of each 
shape, a black line (0.57° length × 0.12° width) was drawn. Three of these lines were vertical 
and one – the target – was tilted 38° either to the left or to the right. The cue to remember 
either the shape or the color of the memory object consisted of the corresponding word (i.e., 
“shape” or “color”), shown in black Courier New, 20-point font, at the center of the screen. 
All stimuli were presented on a gray background.
Procedure. Each trial began with a 500-ms fixation period followed by a 1000-ms 
display of the memory object. After a 500-ms blank interval, a cue was displayed for 500 
ms which indicated whether the shape or the color of the memory object had to be remem-
bered for a later memory test. After a variable inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) of 200, 600, 
1000 or 1400 ms the search display appeared. In the search, task participants were asked to 
discriminate the orientation of the target line by pressing the “Z” key when it was tilted to 
the left and by pressing the “M” key when it was tilted to the right. There were three types of 
trials in the search task (see Figure 1). On color match trials, one of the distractors had the 
same color as the memory object. On shape match trials, one of the distractors had the same 
shape as the memory object. On no match trials, neither of the features of the memory object 
was shared by any of the objects in the search display. Figure 1 illustrates different types of 
Feature-select ive  encod ing  versus  ob ject-based retent ion
in  v isual  work ing  memory
67
5
trials used in Experiment 1. The search response had to be made as quickly and accurately 
as possible. Following this response, there was a 500-ms blank interval before a memory 
probe appeared in the center of the screen. Depending on whether participants were cued 
to encode color or shape, the task for the memory probe was to indicate whether it matched 
the memory object in terms of the to-be-remembered feature – the memory probe never 
matched the to-be-forgotten feature of the memory object. Participants had to press “M” key 
on the keyboard in case the to-be-remembered feature was different and they had to press 
the “Z” key in case it was the same. The memory task had to be completed as accurately as 
possible, without time pressure. The manipulations of the cued feature (color or shape), the 
presence and type of matching distractor (color-match, shape-match, or no-match) and the 
ISI separating the retro-cue and the search display (200, 600, 1000, or 1400 ms) resulted in 
a total of twenty-four conditions. There were 512 trials in total. In half of the trials, there was 
no match between distractors in the search array and the memory object and in the remain-
ing trials the search array included a distractor that matched the color (25%) or shape (25%) 
of the memory object. The experiment was preceded by 32 practice trials.
Fig.1. Illustration of the procedure in experiment 1. the cue indicated whether the color or the shape of 
the memory object had to be remembered. the IsI between the memory object and the search task was 
200, 600, 1000 or 1400 ms. In the memory task, the to-be-forgotten feature of the memory object was 



















We excluded one participant due to chance level performance in the search task. For 
the remaining participants, responses for the search and memory tasks were correct on 97% 
and 88% of the trials, respectively. Before analyzing the reaction times (RTs) for the search 
task, we applied a two-step procedure to exclude outliers. Specifically, we first excluded trials 
with search-RTs shorter than 150 ms or longer than 3000 ms. Next, we applied the proce-
dure described by Van Selst and Jolicoeur (1994) to exclude any remaining outliers. Taken 
together, these procedures resulted in a loss of 2.6% of the data points. Lastly, we excluded 
the trials with incorrect responses in either the search task or memory task. The exclusion of 
the outliers did not change the pattern of the results.  
Mean RTs of search responses were entered in a 2 (cue: color or shape) × 3 (match: 
color, shape or no match) × 4 (ISI: 200, 600, 1000 or 1400 ms) repeated measures ANOVA. 
The only effects to reach significance were the main effects of match, F(2, 46) = 10.48, p = 
.001,    = .31 and ISI, F(3, 69) = 11.99, p < .001, 
    
= .34. The main effect of cue was not signif-
icant, F(1, 23) = 3.22, p = .086, 
    
= .12, and none of the interactions were significant (all Fs < 
1.12, all ps > .334). At the same time, however, the results plotted in Figure 2 did suggest the 
presence of an interaction between cue and match, such that there appeared to be capture 
by color regardless of cue-type, whereas there was some sign of capture by shape only in the 
condition in which shape was cued. To further examine these non-significant effects, we 
conducted a Bayes factors analysis to ascertain the evidence in support of a null effect for the 
interaction between Cue and Match. This analysis indeed corroborated the non-significance 
of the Cue × Match interaction with a BF01 of 9.85, meaning that the data were almost ten 
times more likely under the null hypothesis of no interaction than under the hypothesis that 
these factors did interact. 
Fig.2. Results of experiment 1. Mean Rts (ms) in the search task as a function of cue condition and match 
condition. error bars reflect within-subject standard errors of the mean (Morey, 2008).
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To further examine the main effects of match and ISI, we conducted a series of post-
hoc comparisons using Holm-Bonferroni correction. For the match condition, these tests 
showed that search responses were significantly slower on color match trials (M = 756 ms) 
than on no-match trials (M = 724 ms), t(23) = 5.51, p = .003, and shape match trials (M = 
731 ms), t(23) = 2.72, p = .024. In contrast, there was no significant difference in search RTs 
between shape-match trials and no-match trials, t(23) = 0.99, p = .330, BF01 = 2.985. For the 
main effect of ISI, the pairwise t-tests showed that RTs decreased as ISI increased from 200 
ms (765 ms) to 600 ms (727 ms), t(23) = 4.42, p = .003, whereas there was no further change 
in RTs as ISI increased beyond 600 ms (all p’s > .625). 
Discussion Experiment 1
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 yielded two main findings of interest. First-
ly, they showed that a distractor matching the color of a previously memorized object cap-
tured attention regardless of whether participants had been retro-cued to retain only the 
shape or the color of the object. Secondly, the results showed that a distractor matching the 
shape of an earlier memorized object did not capture attention regardless of whether the 
retro-cue indicated that the shape or the color of the object had to be retained in memory. 
While the combination of these two findings signifies that color may be more potent in guid-
ing attention than shape (see also, Soto et al., 2005, 2006; Soto & Humphreys, 2009; Wolfe 
& Horowitz, 2004) the lack of an effect of cuing on attentional capture by color suggests that 
participants were unable to use the cue to selectively retain only the relevant shape feature 
of the earlier memorized object. In Experiment 2, we investigated whether a selection of 
features is possible during perception, that is, when participants are pre-cued to encode only 
the color or the shape of a subsequently presented object.  
Experiment 2
In demonstrating that a distractor matching the color of an earlier memorized object 
captured attention regardless of whether participants were cued to retain only the object’s 
shape or color, the results of Experiment 1 can be said to present an interesting exception 
to earlier findings demonstrating similarities between the operation of selective attention 
in WM and perceptual encoding. Specifically, earlier findings indicate that attentional se-
lection in WM resembles selection during perceptual encoding. Moreover, in the study re-
ported by Olivers et al. (2006) attentional capture by a specific feature (color or shape) of 
the earlier-perceived object was found only when this feature was pre-cued as relevant, thus 
suggesting, that deployment of attention in perception leads to feature-selective encoding 
and that an individual color feature and an individual shape feature can be encoded sepa-
rately. Interestingly, the results of Experiment 1 show that selection in WM cannot occur for 
an individual shape feature of an object. However, there have also been findings that suggest 
that such feature-selective attention during perception may depend on specific character-
istics of the stimuli and task, as some studies have found that if participants are pre-cued 
to memorize only one feature of an object, they will also automatically encode the other 
features of this object (Gao et al., 2016; cf. Guérard, Morey, Lagace, & Tremblay, 2013) thus 
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demonstrating an instance of object-based selection similar to that seen in Experiment 1. 
Accordingly, an important question for the current study is whether participants would be 
able to encode only the pre-cued feature of the object, given the stimuli and tasks used in 
Experiment 1 of the current study. In Experiment 2, we addressed this matter by replicating 
Experiment 1 with the difference that the cue to remember only color or shape was now pre-
sented before – rather than after – the object itself. Thus, Experiment 2 served to test wheth-
er participants could selectively encode only the color or the shape of an object, as would be 
expected on the basis of earlier findings by Olivers et al. Note however that given the results 
reported in Experiment 1 and previous findings by Soto et al. (2005; 2006; 2009), we do not 
expect capture effect by shape feature as in this paradigm memory-matching shape feature 
seems to be insufficient to influence external selection.  
Method
Participants. Twenty-four students enrolled in the English language Psychology 
bachelor program at the University of Groningen participated in the experiment for partial 
course credit.  All participants had normal or corrected to normal visual acuity (14 females; 
M = 20.5 years; SD = 1.26). The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Psychol-
ogy Department. Informed written consent was obtained.
Apparatus and Stimuli. The stimuli and apparatus were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1. 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except that the cue for shape 
or color was presented 500 ms prior to the appearance of the memory object. 
 Results 
We excluded one participant due to chance level performance in the search task. The 
remaining participants were correct on 86% of the trials for the memory task and on 96% of 
the trials for the search task. To exclude outliers for the analysis of search-RTs we followed 
the same procedure as in Experiment 1 and this resulted in a loss of 2.9% of data points. 
Lastly, we excluded the trials with incorrect responses in either the search task or memory 
task. The exclusion of the outliers did not change the pattern of the results.  
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on mean RTs of search responses. The 
results showed that the main effects of match and ISI were significant, F(2, 46) = 9.87, p < 
.001,     = .30, and F(3, 69) = 5.29, p = .009,     = .19, respectively. The interaction between the 
cue and match conditions just failed to reach significance (see Figure 3), F(2, 46) = 3.21, p 
= .05,     = .12, with a BF10 = 2.65, indicating that the data were 2.65 times more likely under 
the hypothesis that there was indeed an interaction. The main effect of cue condition and all 
other interaction effects did not reach significance (all F’s < 1.47, all p’s > .227). 
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Fig.3. Results of experiment 2. Mean Rts (ms) in the search task as a function of cue condition and match 
condition. error bars reflect within-subject standard errors of the mean (Morey, 2008)
To further examine the basis for the trend in the direction of a Cue × Match interaction, 
we conducted two additional ANOVAs to examine the effect of Match for each Cue condition 
separately. These analyses showed that the effect of match was significant when participants 
were cued to remember only the color of the object, F(2, 46) = 9.69, p < .001, 
2
ph = .30, but 
not when they were cued to remember on the object’s shape, F(2, 46) = 0.95, p = .395, 
2
ph = 
.04. For the color-cued condition, pairwise t-tests  showed that search responses were slower 
on color-match trials (747 ms) than on no-match trials (703 ms), t(23) = 3.93, p < .003 and 
shape-match trials (715 ms), t(23) = 2.85, p = .018, whereas there was no significant differ-
ence between shape-match trials and no-match trials, t(23) = 1.38, p = .180. For the main 
effect of ISI, the pairwise t-tests showed that RTs decreased as ISI increased from 200 ms 
(765 ms) to 600 ms (727 ms), t(23) = 4.42, p = .003, whereas there was no further change 
in RTs as ISI increased beyond 600 ms (all p’s > .625).Thus, the results of Experiment 2 
showed that participants were able to selectively encode only the task-relevant feature of the 
subsequently presented object, such that a distractor matching the color of the earlier shown 
object only captured attention when participants were pre-cued to encode the color of this 
object, and not when they were pre-cued to encode the object’s shape.
General Discussion
In the current study, we used the memory-driven attentional capture effect to inves-
tigate whether participants are able to selectively encode and retain a single feature of an 
object in WM. Specifically, we used a retro-cuing manipulation to examine whether partici-
pants would be able to selectively retain only the shape or the color of an object held in WM, 
and we used a pre-cuing manipulation to examine whether participants would be able to 
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selectively encode one of these features for a subsequently presented object. 
The results of the current study suggest a different effect of pre and retro-cues, such 
that participants were unable to use a retro-cue to selectively retain only the shape of an 
earlier memorized object and thus forget no longer relevant color feature (Experiment 1), 
whereas they were successful in selectively encoding only the shape feature in case this fea-
ture was pre-cued before the presentation of the object (Experiment 2). In addition, our 
results made clear that the likelihood of attentional capture by either relevant or irrelevant 
color feature did not depend on the inter-stimulus interval separating the retro-cue (in Ex-
periment 1) or the memory object (in Experiment 2) from the ensuing search task. Lastly, we 
found that in both experiments shape did not exert an influence on external selection even 
when the shape was pre-cued or retro-cued as relevant.1 
The capture by color and the lack of the capture by shape has been already reported 
in the previous studies (Soto et al., 2005, 2006; Soto & Humphreys, 2009). These findings 
suggest that color might be a more potent feature for guiding attention than shape. While 
some of the previous studies found that shape was ineffective in guiding visual attention 
(Pan, 2010; Soto et al., 2005, 2006), others provided evidence for such a shape-based mem-
ory-driven attentional capture effect (Gao et al., 2016; Olivers et al., 2006). These contra-
dictory findings seem to suggest that capture effect based on shape is dependent on the task 
conditions rather than the shape feature itself. Because the current study was not designed 
to test the conditions under which specific features guide visual attention, we will not spec-
ulate about this matter further and all interpretations will be accordingly restricted to the 
observed effects for color.
In interpreting the finding that participants were unable to selectively retain only the 
shape of an earlier memorized object (Experiment 1), two explanations can be considered. 
First, this finding may suggest that attentional selection in WM operates on object represen-
tations which can only be selected as a whole, and not in terms of the individual features that 
make up the object. According to this object-based selection account, features of an object 
are stored in an integrated form in WM and thus, selection of the task-relevant feature is 
accompanied by the automatic selection of the task-irrelevant feature (Gao, Gao, Li, Sun, & 
Shen, 2011; Luck & Vogel, 1997). Alternatively, the current findings may also be explained in 
terms of a feature-based selection account that argues that features of the object held in WM 
are stored separately (Fougnie et al., 2011; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002) and that selection 
can operate on the individual features that constitute the object. In the following sections, 
we will discuss these two accounts of the results of Experiment 1 in further detail. 
The interpretation that object-based selection drove the results of Experiment 1 can 
be said to be consistent with the results reported by Gajewski and Brockmole (2006), who 
found that the forgetting or retention of an object in WM entails that all of its features are 
forgotten or retained. In another study, Astle and colleagues also found evidence that se-
lection in WM operates on objects, not features (Astle, Scerif, Kuo, & Nobre, 2009). In this 
study, participants performed a visual search task in which they needed to detect a feature 
that was defined by a retro-cue. Specifically, participants were first shown a colored shape 
that had to be encoded in memory, and they were subsequently shown a cue which indicated 
1 It is important to highlight that the analysis of the current data was restricted to trials with correct responses in the mem-
ory test to ensure that the to-be-remembered feature was indeed correctly remembered. 
Feature-select ive  encod ing  versus  ob ject-based retent ion
in  v isual  work ing  memory
73
5
whether the color or the shape of this object constituted the target template for the search 
task. In the search task, two objects were shown, of which one could have either the rele-
vant or the irrelevant feature, and the task for the participants was to indicate whether the 
relevant feature was present or absent. By using EEG, the authors were able to demonstrate 
attentional effects for both the relevant and the irrelevant feature, thus indicating that both 
features influenced performance, despite the cue to search for only one of these features. 
Taken together, the results from Gajewski and Brockmole and Astle et al. show that once an 
object has been encoded into WM, it can only be retained or forgotten as a whole. Here we 
found that the instruction to selectively retain only the shape of the earlier encoded object 
was ineffective, such that the uncued color feature continued to exert an influence in the 
form of guiding attention towards matching stimulus. This finding can be interpreted in 
terms of object-based selection, which would be consistent with the findings reported by 
Gajewski and Brockmole and Astle et al.
Alternatively, the finding that a retro-cue to remember either color or shape did not 
modulate attentional capture by color can also be explained by a feature-based selection 
account. However, this account requires a number of additional assumptions in order to 
accommodate the current data, and some of these assumptions appear at odds with previ-
ous findings. To be precise, a feature-based selection account would require the assumption 
that memory activation for color is stronger than activation for a less salient feature such as 
shape, thus allowing the color to dominate over shape in guiding attention. This assumption 
seems to be reasonable given that previous findings show that colors are remembered more 
easily than shapes such as random polygons or Chinese characters (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 
2004) and findings that color images of natural scenes are remembered better and recog-
nized faster than achromatic images (Gegenfurtner & Rieger, 2000). Second, it has to be as-
sumed that a higher level of activation for color entails that this activation cannot be reduced 
by selecting a different feature such as shape, which would explain why the requirement to 
select only the shape of an object being held in WM did not lead to attenuation of the cap-
ture by no-longer relevant color. However, this assumption appears to be at odds with some 
previous findings. Specifically, in a recent study, we found that the instruction to forget an 
earlier-memorized colored shape lead to a significant reduction of attentional capture by a 
matching object (Sasin, Morey, & Nieuwenstein, 2017). This finding is of relevance because 
it shows that a WM representation that includes color can be partially deactivated once it 
is no longer relevant. Moreover, the results of other studies seem to suggest that when the 
selection of one of two colored shapes held in WM is required, the no longer relevant object 
is completely forgotten (Olivers et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2013). In light of these findings, 
feature-based selection account appears to be less suited to explain the results of Experiment 
1 than object-based selection account.       
While the requirement to select individual shape feature of an object in WM does not 
lead to forgetting of an irrelevant color feature, the selection of information during percep-
tual encoding does appear to allow for the selective encoding of individual shape feature 
while filtering out irrelevant color feature. This is indicated by the results of Experiment 2, 
where we found that pre-cuing the to-be-remembered feature did result in a modulation 
of attentional capture, such that in this case, capture only occurred for the task-relevant, 
to-be-remembered color feature. In demonstrating a feature-specific encoding effect, the 
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results of Experiment 2 converge with earlier findings by Olivers et al. (2006) while they 
oppose the results of Gao et al. (2016), who found evidence suggestive of object-based en-
coding. In considering the implications of these opposing results, a first conclusion would 
be that attentional selection during perceptual encoding can be either feature-specific (i.e., 
resulting in memory storage of a specific feature) or object-based (i.e., resulting in memory 
storage of the entire object). When considering the conditions under which these different 
outcomes have been observed, it becomes apparent that the occurrence of feature-specific 
encoding may depend on whether the feature in question is pre-cued on a trial-by-trial ba-
sis (as in the current study) or whether it is fixed across a block of trials (as in the study by 
Gao et al.), on whether the feature is drawn from a set of easily discriminable features (e.g., 
red, green or blue vs. three shades of red), and on whether the memory probe that is used 
to assess memory for the earlier presented feature can or cannot include the irrelevant, to-
be-ignored feature (Soto & Humphreys, 2009). Across these different factors, the common 
denominator appears to be that feature-specific encoding is more likely to occur when the 
demand for selective encoding is high due to either the potential for confusion (i.e., with a 
previously cued feature or in judging the memory probe), or to the difficulty of encoding 
the feature in question (i.e., when this feature is drawn from a set of features that are highly 
similar, such as three shades of red). An interesting question for future research will be to 
investigate and compare the effects of these different factors directly.
Taken together, the results of the current study suggest that while a specific feature 
such as shape can be encoded selectively during perception, this feature cannot be selective-
ly retained after an object has been encoded in WM. With this combination of results, the 
current findings present an interesting exception to previous findings which suggest that 
effects of attention seen during perceptual encoding can also occur for objects held in WM 
(e.g., Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2011; Dell’Acqua et al., 2010; Eimer & Kiss, 2010; Lewis & 
Bates, 2013). Specifically, while previous findings have shown that the selection of objects 
can be done on the basis of features such as color or location in both memory and percep-
tion, the current findings suggest that when it comes to selecting individual shape feature 
of colored shape, this can only be done in perception, but not in memory. In accounting for 
this discrepancy, an important consideration lies in the nature of the representation upon 
which attention operates during perception and memory. During perception, visual features 
such as color and shape are initially represented by individual populations of neurons whose 
activation may result in the eventual binding and encoding of these features into an object 
representation in WM. In pre-cuing participants to only encode the color or shape of an 
object, attention can be used as a gate to allow only the relevant feature of the object to be 
sufficiently activated to result in encoding in WM, with the occurrence of such selective en-
coding being dependent on the factors mentioned in the preceding section. In contrast, the 
retention of a previously seen object in WM involves the sustained activation of all object 
features. One possibility is that such activation is integrated into a coherent representation 
(Gao et al., 2011; Luria & Vogel, 2011; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001). By implication, it 
follows that a cue to retain only the shape of the colored shape would automatically result 
in the activation of the color feature encoded in this representation, thus precluding the 
possibility for selective retention and forgetting of an individual color feature of the ob-
ject. Another possibility is that object in WM is stored as a collection of separable features 
Feature-select ive  encod ing  versus  ob ject-based retent ion
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(Fougnie et al., 2011; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002; Woodman & Vogel, 2008), but forgetting 
of the color feature does not follow selection of the shape feature, because activation of rep-
resentation of the color feature strongly dominate over shape.  
To conclude, the current study shows that once an object is encoded in WM, a cue that 
indicates the relevance of only one of the object’s features such as shape will not lead to for-
getting of the no longer relevant color of this object. In contrast, such feature-selective pro-
cessing does appear to be possible during perceptual encoding, as we found that pre-cuing 
shape before the presentation of the object does result in feature-specific memory for only 
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Working memory (WM) is a cognitive system that enables the maintenance and ma-
nipulation of information that is no longer present in our environment. As such, WM plays a 
crucial role in goal-directed behavior as it is mandatory for any task that requires conscious 
access to previously perceived information. Since only a limited amount of information can 
be represented in WM at a given moment (Cowan, 2010), it is crucial to encode and main-
tain information that is relevant to our current behavioral goals and to remove information 
that is no longer relevant. How information is encoded, maintained and deactivated in WM 
are therefore key questions in understanding human information processing. 
The studies documented in this thesis investigated how various manipulations influ-
ence the encoding, maintenance, and deactivation of information in WM. To this end, we 
used the memory-driven attentional capture effect as an index of WM activation. This effect 
refers to the finding that attentional selection can be biased by the content of WM, such that 
the activation of information in WM increases the likelihood that attention will be drawn 
towards matching information in the environment (Downing, 2000; Gao et al., 2016; Ol-
ivers, 2009; Olivers et al., 2006; Pan, 2010; Soto et al., 2005; Soto & Humphreys, 2007). 
Therefore, the activation of a representation in WM can be assessed by determining whether 
visual attention is deployed to an object that matches this representation.  
With regard to the encoding of information in WM, the studies documented in this 
thesis present several findings of interest to understanding how different task demands in-
fluence the establishment and strength of a representation in WM. To start, the study re-
ported in Chapter 5 shows that attention can be used to selectively encode a specific feature 
of an object. Specifically, in this study, participants were precued as to whether the shape or 
the color of a subsequently shown object had to be encoded in WM. Next, participants per-
formed a visual search task in which one of the distractors could match the shape or color of 
the earlier shown object. The results showed evidence for attentional capture by distractors 
that matched the color of the earlier shown object, but only when this color was precued as 
the relevant feature, thus demonstrating that during perception, attention can act as a gate 
that determines which feature of an object is stored in WM. Such selective encoding of indi-
vidual object features fits well with previous findings showing that the requirement to select 
one feature of an object for representation in WM does not automatically lead the other 
features of this object to be encoded as well (Chen & Wyble, 2015; Chen, Swan, & Wyble, 
2016; Olivers et al., 2006). Another finding that illustrates the modulatory role of task de-
mands in transferring information to WM can be found in the study reported in Chapter 2. 
In this study, we found that deep encoding (i.e., extracting the meaning of a word) results in 
attentional capture by a matching picture in a subsequent RSVP task, whereas shallow en-
coding (i.e., judging whether the word is written in uppercase or lowercase) does not result 
in capture. Importantly, in this study, participants were not asked to remember the words. 
Accordingly, this finding suggests that the requirement to access the meaning of a word for a 
conscious judgment requires WM activation, which in turn guides visual attention towards a 
picture depicting the referent of this word. Taken together, the results presented in this the-
sis demonstrate that mechanisms of attentional selection can act as filter for the information 
that is represented in WM (Chapter 5) and they make clear that the requirement to access 
the meaning of a word requires the activation of that word in WM (Chapter 2).   
With regard to the maintenance of information in WM, the work collected in this thesis 
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shows how interference that arises from performing another task can modulate the activation 
of representations held in WM. Specifically, in the study reported in Chapter 2, we found that 
attentional capture by pictures that correspond to a word that has previously undergone deep 
encoding is eliminated when the word is followed by a memory-encoding task, thus suggest-
ing that this activation can be overwritten by new information in WM. The study reported in 
Chapter 3 extends these findings by showing that whereas capture produced by residual WM 
activation is abolished when observers have to execute a secondary task after processing the 
word, the requirement to remember the word leads to capture regardless of the presence of the 
secondary task. This finding suggests that the requirement to remember the word allowed the 
representation of this word to be reactivated in WM after processing intermediate task. Taken 
together, these findings indicate a difference between residual versus goal-driven WM activa-
tion. While goal-driven WM activation can be reinstated after dual-task interference, residual 
WM activation will be lost due to dual-task interference.  
Lastly, the studies documented in this thesis also address the extent to which people are 
capable of removing a no longer relevant object or feature from WM. In particular, the work 
documented in Chapter 4 investigated how WM activation is modulated by means of an in-
struction to forget. In this study, we found that a cue to forget an earlier memorized object 
reduced attentional capture by a subsequently presented distractor that matched the earlier 
memorized object. In addition, we found that this capture effect was not modulated by the 
duration of the interval between the cue to forget and the visual search task. These findings 
suggest that people are able to intentionally forget a single object held in WM and that such 
forgetting leads to rapid but incomplete deactivation of the representation of this object. In 
contrary, in the study reported in Chapter 5, we found that attention was directed towards dis-
tractors that shared their color with an item held in WM regardless of whether this color had 
to be remembered or whether it could be forgotten. These findings imply that people cannot 
selectively remember just one of the features of an object held in WM, thus supporting the 
notion that forgetting in WM is object-based (Gajewski & Brockmole, 2006). To sum up, the 
current results suggest that instruction to forget leads to incomplete deactivation of the repre-
sentation of a single object held in WM, whereas instruction to remember one of the features 
of the object held in WM does not result in deactivation of the no longer relevant feature. 
Taken together, the studies presented in this thesis provide evidence for the dynamic 
fluctuation of WM activation in response to different task demands. In the following subsec-
tions, I will further discuss the broader theoretical implications of these findings.   
What is voluntary about involuntary attentional capture?
Taken together, the studies reported in this thesis present several examples wherein 
information activated in WM was shown to result in attentional capture by newly presented 
stimuli that matched the contents of WM. An important question is whether this phenome-
non of memory-driven attentional capture is automatic or at least to some extent voluntary. 
On the one hand, it has been shown that attention is directed toward irrelevant items match-
ing WM content even when this always harms performance (Mannan, Kennard, Potter, Pan, 
& Soto, 2010; Soto & Humphreys, 2008; Soto, Humphreys, & Heinke, 2006). This suggests 
that memory-driven attentional capture is an automatic effect that occurs involuntarily. Al-
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ternatively, it could also be argued that memory-driven capture may arise as a result of a 
strategy of refreshing the memory trace in WM by resampling corresponding information 
from the environment. 
The data presented in this thesis present several findings that appear inconsistent with 
a resampling account. Specifically, in the study reported in Chapter 2, we found that at-
tention was drawn to pictures matching earlier-processed words even when participants 
were not informed that memory for those words would be tested at the end of the experi-
ment, and, thus, they did not have a reason to refresh memory activation by attending to the 
matching picture. Moreover, the results documented in Chapter 3 suggest that the residual 
WM activation that results from deep encoding of a word may be as potent as goal-driven 
WM activation in biasing attentional selection. This again opposes the refreshing account as 
this account would seem to predict that participants would more often direct their attention 
toward pictures depicting the words that have to be remembered than towards pictures de-
picting the words that do not have to be remembered. Furthermore, in the study presented 
in Chapter 4, we found that attention was shifted to a distractor matching a to-be-forgotten 
object even when we never tested participant’s memory for the objects they were instructed 
to forget. Lastly, the results reported in Chapter 5 also seem to speak against the hypothesis 
that attention is strategically allocated to a WM-matching distractor to improve memory. 
In this study, the most beneficial strategy would be to forget the no-longer relevant color 
as this would decrease the likelihood of interference from this feature in the memory test 
(Oberauer, 2001). However, we found that an instruction to remember only the shape of an 
object did not eliminate attentional capture by the no-longer relevant color of that object. 
Taken together, despite the lack of the prospective benefits for memory performance, 
we found that attention was deployed to distractors that matched the contents of WM (Chap-
ter 2, Chapter 4, Chapter 5), which could be taken as an argument against the assumption 
that voluntary memory resampling underlies or at least contributes to the memory-driven 
capture effect. Instead, the current findings are consistent with an account that assumes that 
the activation of information in WM automatically results in attentional selection of match-
ing inputs from the environment (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Soto, Hodsoll, Rotshtein, & 
Humphreys, 2008).
Guidance of attention by WM without active goal-driven maintenance
The work documented in this thesis presents several findings showing that recently 
processed items can guide visual attention even when there is no requirement to hold these 
items in memory. This is in contrast to a key assumption of many studies on memory-driv-
en attentional capture, according to which, this effect depends on the active, goal-driven 
maintenance of representations in WM (Kiyonaga & Egner, 2013; Olivers et al., 2006). For 
instance, Olivers et al. (2006) found no evidence of memory-driven attentional capture by 
a matching item in a search display when memory for this item was tested prior the search 
task. This finding suggests that the representation of an item that was recently held in WM 
cannot guide attention when goal-driven maintenance of this item is no longer required, thus 
arguing against the possibility that residual activations can bias visual attention. However, it 
is important to note that this finding may be explained by deactivation of the representation 
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of the item in WM when the recognition task was executed. Such a deactivation may be due 
to interference caused by the processing demands associated with the recognition task in 
which the memory item had to be selected among three alternatives. This interpretation is 
supported by the results presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 that showed that pictures 
of words that had undergone deep encoding attracted visual attention, but only when there 
was no concurrent task that has to be executed after processing the word, thus suggesting 
that residual activation of the word is overwritten by encoding new items (Chapter 2) or by 
performing simple arithmetic task (Chapter 3). 
Other studies also seem to suggest that only active maintenance of an item in WM can 
lead to memory-driven capture effect. For example, it has been demonstrated that when 
participants are presented with an object without any requirement to hold it in memory, 
a matching item will not attract visual attention in a subsequent task (Soto et al., 2005). 
In explaining the findings by Soto et al., it is important to note that the results collected in 
this thesis suggest that initial activation of the item in WM is mandatory to observe mem-
ory-driven capture without active, goal-driven maintenance (see also Pashler & Shiu, 1999; 
Soto & Humphreys, 2007). In particular, the results of the studies described in Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3 suggest that requirement to judge the semantic property of a word leads to 
residual WM activation that in turn influences the allocation of visual attention even when 
the word does not have to be held in WM.  Likewise, in the work presented in Chapter 4, 
we found that an instruction to forget a single object held in WM led to a reduction but 
not an elimination of attentional capture by items matching to-be-forgotten representation. 
Although the lack of initial activation of the item in WM can explain the lack of capture in 
the study by Soto et al., (2005), it does not explain why the capture effect did not occur in 
a study reported by Kumar et al. (2009). Specifically, in this study, Kumar et al. compared 
a condition in which participants were asked to hold an object in WM for a later test with 
a priming condition in which participants were asked to compare two objects presented 
one after another and to withhold their response to the search display whenever the second 
object differed in either color or shape from the first object. The behavioral and electrophys-
iological results provided evidence for a WM-bias of visual search in the memory condition 
but not in the priming condition. The lack of capture in the priming condition is surprising, 
given that the comparison task would appear to require the activation of the to-be-compared 
object in WM. Future studies should examine the role of WM in the comparison task that 
was used by Kumar et al. to shed some light on why this task does not lead to a capture effect. 
Taken together, the results presented in this thesis present clear evidence that residual 
WM activation can lead to attentional capture by matching stimuli in the environment, and 
they thus demonstrate that active, goal-driven maintenance is not required for capture to 
occur. Importantly, however, it does seem to be the case that capture by residual activation 
can only occur when initial activation of the item in WM is required and when such activa-
tion is not disrupted by the requirement to process another task.    
To forget or not to forget: the fate of no-longer relevant information 
In the work presented in this thesis, we used the memory-driven capture paradigm 
to monitor the waxing and waning of WM activation due to different task requirements. 
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This method is a highly useful tool because testing WM activation is not limited to a few 
trials per participant as would be the case when an explicit measure of incidental recall or 
recognition is used to probe the memory representation of a previously encountered object. 
Specifically, previous studies showed that including even a small amount of trials on which 
participant’s memory is probed for items that they were instructed to forget leads partic-
ipants to ignore the instruction to forget (Williams & Woodman, 2012), and thus explicit 
testing can only be done on a few trials per participant (Williams, Hong, Kang, Carlisle, & 
Woodman, 2013). In the current thesis, the memory-driven capture paradigm enabled us 
to provide a more powerful test of whether a single object held in WM can be intentionally 
forgotten (Chapter 4) and how the requirement for selective remembering of a particular 
feature of an object influence WM activation for the other features of this object (Chapter 5). 
The results presented in this thesis provide evidence for the existence of an active removal 
mechanism that can operate in the absence of the interference from competing to-be-re-
membered information. Specifically, the study reported in Chapter 4 tested people’s ability 
to forget a single object held in WM, and the results showed that an instruction to forget an 
earlier memorized object led to a reduction in the capture effect. Given that this reduction 
in attentional capture occurred in the absence of concurrent to-be-maintained information, 
this finding suggests that people can choose to deactivate a representation of a single object 
in WM, thus offering support for the proposed existence of an active removal mechanism 
(Oberauer & Lin, 2017). According to this model, no-longer relevant representations are 
removed by Hebbian antilearning which attenuates the association between an item and a 
context marker. Importantly, however, the capture effect was not completely abolished after 
an instruction to forget, which means that some activation persisted even after the instruc-
tion to forget. In this regard, our findings differ from those of previous studies that provided 
evidence for complete forgetting when people are cued to remember one of two items cur-
rently held in WM (Olivers et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2013). In light of these findings, it 
appears to be the case that the presence of concurrent to-be-remembered representation can 
facilitate forgetting of no-longer relevant information in WM. Interpreted in terms of Ober-
auer’s proposal that forgetting occurs by unbinding a representation in WM from its context 
(Oberauer & Lin, 2017), this set of findings may be taken to suggest that shifting the focus 
of attention to a to-be-remembered representation will amplify the connection weights for 
the to-be-remembered representation which in turn further undermines the association be-
tween the to-be-forgotten item and the context that this item it is bound to. 
The Hebbian antilearning mechanism that underlies unbinding in Oberauer and Lin’s 
model (2017) is also of relevance to understanding the results obtained in Chapter 5, which 
show that an instruction to remember only the shape of an object stored in WM did not 
eliminate or reduce attentional capture by the no-longer relevant color of this object. This 
finding suggests that the no-longer relevant color was not forgotten and not even partial-
ly deactivated. Assuming that removing a no-longer relevant representation from WM is 
accomplished by unbinding the item from its context, the attenuation of the association 
between the item and the context would be inadvisable if one of the features of this item 
has to be held in memory. Taken together, the results reported in Chapters 4 and 5 provide 
support for the existence of an active removal mechanism that can be used to deactivate a 
representation of an object in WM as they suggest that such deactivation can be observed 
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in the absence of the interference from competing to-be-remembered material (Chapter 4). 
Furthermore, the current results imply that forgetting in WM is object-based.    
Regarding intentional forgetting of no-longer relevant information, an intriguing find-
ing in the study reported in Chapter 4 is that the ISI between a cue to forget an earlier 
remembered item and the subsequent search task did not influence attentional capture by 
distractors matching the to-be-forgotten item. Therefore, we found no evidence for a dete-
rioration of to-be-forgotten representations over time. This speaks strongly against decay 
theories which assume that information that is not actively maintained decays over time 
(Barrouillet & Camos, 2012; Barrouillet et al., 2004). The role of time in the forgetting of 
information in WM is also incorporated in the temporal distinctiveness theories (Oberauer 
& Lewandowsky, 2008; Souza & Oberauer, 2014). Specifically, these theories propose that 
forgetting depends on the amount of time between the two events. That is, temporal dis-
tinctiveness between the two potentially interfering events (e.g. requirement to remember 
two successive pieces of information) decreases when the time interval between these events 
increases, which increases the likelihood of forgetting. Note, however, that the results pre-
sented in Chapter 4 do not oppose temporal distinctiveness theories as according to these 
theories the lower temporal distinctiveness increases the likelihood of forgetting because it 
increases the degree of interference between two events. However, forgetting in Chapter 4 
was tested for a single item held in WM, thus in the absence of any interfering to-be-remem-
bered information.  
To summarize, the finding that attentional capture is rapidly reduced following a cue to 
forget a single object held in WM suggests that people can intentionally deactivate a single 
item held in WM and thus provide evidence for an active removal mechanism that can oper-
ate rapidly (Chapter 4). In addition, the finding that a retro-cue to remember only the shape 
of an earlier memorized, colored shape did not lead to reduced attentional capture for items 
matching the color of this object provides evidence for the notion that forgetting in WM is 
object-based (Chapter 5).
Dynamic states in working memory 
The studies documented in this thesis provide findings that can be understood in the 
context of the state-based models which assume that the representation of information in 
WM can be described in terms of different states of activation, which fluctuate due to at-
tentional prioritization (Cowan, 2011; Oberauer, 2002, 2013; Olivers, Peters, Houtkamp, 
& Roelfsema, 2011). Specifically, a central assumption of these accounts is that attention 
can modulate the activation of representations in WM, such that the information that is 
currently relevant is assumed to be prioritized by the focus of attention whereas information 
that is currently irrelevant may still be maintained in WM but in a more latent state (Laroc-
que, Lewis-Peacock, & Postle, 2014; Lepsien & Nobre, 2007; Lewis-Peacock & Postle, 2012; 
Myers, Stokes, & Nobre, 2017; Wolff, Jochim, Akyurek, & Stokes, 2017). The representation 
that is in the focus of attention is thought to exert the strongest influence on visual attention 
(Olivers et al., 2011). 
In the studies presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 we found that when people were 
asked to judge the semantic property of a word, attention was guided toward the picture 
General  D iscuss ion
85
6
depicting the referent of this word in a subsequent visual task. This capture effect was elimi-
nated when an additional task had to be performed after judging the word, whereas capture 
occurred despite the presence of the intermediate task when the word had to be remem-
bered. The magnitude of the capture was the same regardless of whether the capture result-
ed from a deep encoding of a word or from goal-driven maintenance of a word. Interpreted 
according to the state-based accounts of WM, a possible explanation of these results could 
be that the words that have to be remembered were maintained in the focus of attention 
state, while the words that were deeply encoded without a need to remember them were 
maintained in the more latent state which could be conceptualized as accessory state (Oliv-
ers et al., 2011), state of direct access (Oberauer, 2002) or activated part of long-term mem-
ory (Cowan, 2011). The words maintained in the focus of attention state are protected from 
the interference from an additional task, whereas words maintained in the more latent state 
can be overwritten by the requirement to process additional task. Interestingly, the results 
presented in Chapter 3 also suggest that representations of words in an accessory state are 
as potent in guiding visual attention as representations in the focus of attention state. In the 
study presented in Chapter 4, we found a reduction in attentional capture by WM matching 
object when this object was followed by the instruction to forget, thus suggesting that this 
item was deactivated. These finding could be explained by a transition of WM representa-
tion of the object from an active focus of attention state to a more latent accessory state, in 
which it has limited influence on visual attention.
Taken together the data presented in this thesis provide evidence for a dynamic fluc-
tuation in WM activations that arise from different task requirements such as the type of 
encoding (Chapter 2, Chapter 3), processing of an additional task (Chapter 2, Chapter 3) or 
intentional forgetting (Chapter 4). These data can be easily accommodated by state-based 










De kernfuncties van het werkgeheugen zijn het actief houden en manipuleren van infor-
matie, en deze functies maken doelgericht gedrag mogelijk. De meeste taken die we in het 
dagelijks leven uitvoeren vereisen de inschakeling van het werkgeheugen. Een voorbeeld is 
het doen van boodschappen. Voor elk product op het lijstje moet je een mentale represen-
tatie maken en die actief houden terwijl je een visuele zoektaak uitvoert om het gezochte 
product te vinden tussen andere producten in de winkel. Wanneer je het product dat je zocht 
gevonden hebt kun je de mentale representatie van dit product wissen, en een representatie 
maken van een ander product op het booschappenlijstje. Op het moment dat je alle pro-
ducten hebt gevonden ga je je boodschappen afrekenen, en heb je je werkgeheugen nodig 
om het af te rekenen bedrag te uit te tellen, of om de pincode van je betaalpas te activeren. 
Ondanks het feit dat we constant nieuwe informatie moeten verwerken zit er een capaciteit-
slimiet op het werkgeheugen, en kan alle informatie dus niet tegelijkertijd verwerkt worden. 
Omwille van efficient gebruik is het daarom van fundamenteel belang dat het werkgeheugen 
enkel relevante informatie codeert en vasthoudt, en dat informatie die irrelevant is vergeten 
wordt. De studies in dit proefschrift onderzoeken hoe verscheidene taakvereisten het co-
deren, vasthouden, en wissen van informatie in het werkgeheugen beïnvloeden.
In dit proefschrift worden een aantal interessante bevindingen gepresenteerd aan-
gaande het coderen van informatie in het werkgeheugen. Deze bevindingen laten zien hoe 
verschillende taakvereisten de totstandkoming en sterkte van een representatie in het werk-
geheugen beïnvloeden. Om te beginnen laat de studie in Hoofdstuk 5 zien dat aandacht 
aangewend kan worden om selectief een bepaalde eigenschap van een object op te slaan. 
In deze studie werden proefpersonen vantevoren ingelicht of ze de vorm of de kleur van 
een later gepresenteerd object in het werkgeheugen dienden op te slaan. Vervolgens deden 
proefpersonen een visuele zoektaak waarin één van de afleidende objecten in vorm of kleur 
overeenkwam met het eerder getoonde object. De resultaten lieten zien dat de afleidende ob-
jecten die qua kleur gelijk waren aan het eerder getoonde object de aandacht grepen, maar 
enkel wanneer de kleur in eerste instantie was aangegeven als de relevante eigenschap. Dit 
laat zien dat aandacht tijdens waarneming fungeert als een poortwachter die bepaalt welke 
eigenschap van een object in het werkgeheugen opgeslagen wordt. Dit selectieve opslaan 
van individuele objecteigenschappen valt goed te rijmen met eerdere bevindingen die lieten 
zien dat de selectie van een bepaalde objecteigenschap voor representatie in het werkgeheu-
gen niet automatisch leidt tot de opslag van andere objecteigenschappen (Chen & Wyble, 
2015; Chen, Swan, & Wyble, 2016; Olivers et al., 2006). Een andere bevinding die de mod-
ulerende rol van taakvereisten op informatieoverdracht naar het werkgeheugen illustreert 
wordt gepresenteerd in Hoodfstukken 2 en 3. In de studie in Hoofdstuk 2 vonden we dat 
diepe encodering (in dit geval het extraheren van de betekenis van een woord) ertoe leidt dat 
de aandacht in een daaropvolgende visual-taak gegrepen wordt door een afbeelding van het 
betreffende voorwerp, terwijl oppervlakkige encodering (in dit geval het beoordelen of een 
woord in hoofdletters of kleine letters is geschreven) niet tot dit effect leidt. Van belang is dat 
de proefpersonen in deze studie niet werd gevraagd om het woord te onthouden. Daarom 
suggereert deze bevinding dat het beoordelen van de betekenis van een woord activering van 
deze betekenis in het werkgeheugen vereist, welke vervolgens de visuele aandacht leidt naar 
een plaatje dat het woord afbeeldt. Samen laten deze resultaten zien dat mechanismen van 
aandacht kunnen werken als een filter voor welke informatie in het werkgeheugen wordt 
gerepresenteerd (Hoofdstuk 5), en ze maken duidelijk dat het beoordelen van de betekenis 
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van een woord resulteert in de activatie van dat woord in het werkgeheugen (Hoofdstuk 2).
Met betrekking tot het vasthouden van informatie in het werkgeheugen laat het werk 
in dit proefschrift verder zien dat het uitvoeren van een andere taak de activatie van repre-
sentaties in het werkgeheugen kan moduleren. Zo laat de studie in Hoofdstuk 2 zien dat een 
plaatje van een eerder-beoordeeld woord de aandacht niet meer grijpen wanneer er na de 
verwerking van het woord een nieuwe stimulus moet worden opgeslagen in het werkgeheu-
gen. Dit wekt de suggestie dat de activatie van de representatie van het woord kan worden 
overschreven door het encoderen van nieuwe informatie in het werkgeheugen. De studie in 
Hoofdstuk 3 breidt deze bevindingen verder uit door te laten zien dat het uitvoeren van een 
andere werkgeheugen taak het aandachtseffect niet verstoord wanneer de proefpersonen 
het beoordeelde woord ook moeten onthouden. Deze bevinding suggereert dat de taak om 
het woord te onthouden ertoe leidt dat de representatie van het woord in het werkgeheugen 
gereactiveerd kan worden nadat de andere werkgeheugentaak is uitgevoerd. Tezamen laten 
deze bevindingen zien dat er een verschil bestaat tussen residuele versus doel-gedreven ac-
tivatie van het werkgeheugen. Doel-gedreven werkgeheugen activatie kan worden hersteld 
na het uitvoeren van een tweede taak, terwijl de residuele activatie van het werkgeheugen 
verloren gaat door de interferentie van een tweede taak. 
Ten slotte behandelen de studies in dit proefschrift ook in hoeverre individuen in sta-
at zijn om een object of kenmerk dat niet langer relevant is uit het werkgeheugen te ver-
wijderen. Met name in het in Hoofdstuk 4 gedocumenteerde werk wordt onderzocht hoe 
werkgeheugen activatie wordt gemoduleerd ten gevolge van een instructie om een eerder 
opgeslagen object te vergeten. In deze studie hebben we vastgesteld dat een dergelijke in-
structie leidt tot een vermindering van de mate waarin een later gepresenteerd object de 
aandacht trekt wanneer dit object overeenkomt met het eerder getoonde object. Daarnaast 
vonden we dat deze afname van werkgeheugenactivatie niet afhankelijk is van de duur van 
het interval tussen de indicatie om te vergeten en het uitvoeren van de visuele zoektaak. 
Deze bevindingen suggereren dat mensen in staat zijn om met opzet een object uit het werk-
geheugen te kunnen vergeten en dat dergelijk vergeten leidt tot een snelle maar onvolledige 
deactivatie van de representatie van dit object. In tegenstelling vonden we in het onder-
zoek in Hoofdstuk 5 dat de aandacht werd gericht op afleidende objecten welke hun kleur 
deelden met een object in het werkgeheugen, ongeacht of deze kleur herinnerd of vergeten 
moest worden. Deze bevindingen impliceren dat mensen niet selectief maar één kenmerk 
van een object in het werkgeheugen kunnen vasthouden, hetgeen de opvatting ondersteund 
dat objecten in het werkgeheugen als geheel vergeten of onthouden kunnen worden (Gajew-
ski & Brockmole, 2006). Samenvattend suggereren de huidige resultaten dat de instructie 
om een eerder opgeslagen object te vergeten leidt tot een onvolledige deactivering van de 
representatie van dat object in het werkgeheugen, terwijl de instructie om enkel een van de 
kenmerken van het object te onhouden niet resulteert in de deactivering van het kenmerk 
dat niet langer relevant is.
Samengevat geven de studies in dit proefschrift aan dat het werkgeheugen een dyna-
misch systeem is dat snel kan worden gereorganiseerd om zich aan te passen aan verschillen-
de taakvereisten, zoals het type van encodering (Hoofstuk 2, Hoofdstuk 3), het uitvoeren van 
een extra taak (Hoofdstuk 2, Hoofdstuk 3), of het opzettelijk vergeten van objecten (Hoofd-
stuk 4). De in dit proefschrift beschreven studies bevatten ook bevindingen die suggereren 
dat wanneer aandacht tijdens perceptie alleen de vorm van een object kan selecteren terwijl 
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de irrelevante kleurwordt gefilterd. Het selecteren van de vorm van een object dat al in het 
werkgeheugen is opgeslagen lijkt echter niet te leiden tot het deactiveren van de niet langer 
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